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ABSTRACT
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CLASS AND CONSTRUAL LEVEL
IN SOCIAL JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS BELIEFS
MAY 2017
PRERANA BHARADWAJ,
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
M.S., HUNTER COLLEGE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Ronnie Janoff-Bulman

What predicts support for the redistribution of resources to improve socioeconomic inequality?
Social class, or the subjective perception of one’s resources and position in relation to others in a
larger society, was examined as one relevant characteristic. Across four experiments, social class
as subjective social status was manipulated (two) and measured (all four), and found to have a
significant negative effect on support for the moral values of group-based equality (social justice)
but not on individual deservingness (fairness) separate from political identity and other
demographic characteristics. This effect was seen on stated principles but particularly relevant in
approval ratings of conflict scenarios in which social justice is violated in favor of fairness such
as in instances counter to Affirmative Action policies. Using an abstract/higher construal level or
“big picture” style of thinking (measured in all four studies and manipulated in two studies)
independently predicted objections to the violations of social justice but not fairness in such
scenarios. Socioeconomic inequality has undeniably poor consequences for a society and
understanding the psychological perspectives of those along the social class continuum,
particularly those in power towards the top, may be a step towards alleviating such inequality.
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CHAPTER 1
SOCIAL CLASS, SOCIAL JUSTICE & FAIRNESS
A. Introduction
In an April 2015 Gallup poll of over 5,000 adults across the US, participants
responded to questions about inequality and income distribution with unexpectedly mixed
results (Newport, 2015). Overall, 46% of Americans did not believe income and wealth
are distributed fairly and did support the government taxing the rich to reduce the
inequality. Conversely, 25% believed the distribution is acceptable and that taxing the
rich is not necessary. However, when considering perhaps the most relevant characteristic
of these respondents to these questions on economic inequality--their socioeconomic
status--these beliefs shifted towards two poles of increased and decreased support for
wealth redistribution. Thus, broken down by income, 41% of those who earned over
$75,000 annually believed the national income distribution was acceptable, while this
was true of only 26% of those who earned under $30,000. Of those who opposed the
current income distribution, 61% of low-income participants supported taxing the rich to
resolve the issue, while this was true of only 43% of higher income participants. The
differences in these numbers between high- and low-income participants could be
accounted for by self-interest. After all, the poor would benefit from income
redistribution policies, while the rich would be averse to the costs they would presumably
incur. Indeed, the differences between the numbers would probably be even greater if
income brackets above $75,000 were isolated. However, the numbers are clearly not
explained by self-interest alone: Who are the 26% of low-income individuals who
believed the income distribution was acceptable, and the 59% of high-income individuals
1

who found the distribution unfair? What motivations and contexts explain the 43% of
high-income participants who would tax the rich to even the distribution, at presumed
cost to themselves? If self-interest is not the primary motivation for these beliefs, what
is? The following review of literature in social psychology examines proposed
explanations for why high- and low-social class would predict increased or decreased
support for economic redistribution.
Social justice is the phrase used to capture the moral value supporting the
redistribution of resources to achieve large-scale equality across groups in society. Like
other values, social justice is shaped by long-term contexts. The specific relevant context
addressed here is social class, which is the subjective experience of socioeconomic status
(SES) relative to others in a social hierarchy, often measured as a combination of wealth,
education, and occupational prestige (Saegert, Adler, Bullock, Cauce, Liu, Wyche, 2007).
Research suggests that both objective measures and subjective perceptions of SES can
influence several types of moral judgments, but less is known about the effects of one’s
own socioeconomic status on specific moral judgments of economic and social inequality
(Kraus, Piff & Keltner, 2011).
In understanding beliefs about socioeconomic inequality, socioeconomic status is
likely to be a valuable and important predictive variable. Over the last 50 years in the US,
the income gap between high socioeconomic status groups and low socioeconomic status
groups has only widened. This is significant because low SES has been shown to have
immense negative permanent and cyclical psychological and physiological consequences
for society, such as increased chronic stress, increased health risks, neural changes
decreasing short-term memory, and decreased academic and professional success
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(Saegert, et al., 2007). In aiming to understand and perhaps thereby reduce that
inequality, SES is also an important variable to consider because of the strong influence
high SES individuals have on important societal domains, including education (what is
taught), research (what is studied), business (which companies and people profit), and
politics (which policies are upheld). Research at the intersection of social class and
beliefs about inequality is important as it may be helpful for resolving some of the issues
that come with severe socioeconomic inequality on the national level.
As a step towards conducting research to alleviate the consequences of
socioeconomic inequality, the following literature review will begin by defining
socioeconomic status, social class, and social justice, especially in relation to associated
but separate concepts. Next, existing social psychological research on the influence of
social class/socioeconomic status on endorsement of social justice values and beliefs will
be reviewed. The examined studies will be divided into four sections that answer the
following questions: how high social class would predict low support for social justice,
how low social class would predict high support for social justice, why high social class
might predict high support for social justice, and why low social class might predict low
support for social justice. The latter two sections contradict expected self-interest
motivations and, in fact, involve fewer as well as conflicting findings, leaving
unanswered the question of why the expected self-interest motivations may be violated.
Thus, in the final section, four studies establishing the direct relationship between social
class and beliefs about inequality and meritocracy, and testing a conceptual
mediator/predictor, will be presented that attempt to bring the incongruous research
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together into a cohesive model better explaining the influence of social class on social
justice beliefs.
B. Defining Social Class
As a specific form of status, social class is complex, so it is important to begin by
reviewing the social psychological understanding of “status” as a general concept.
Although studies have historically conflated status with other related characteristics, such
as “power,” recent research has sought to better clarify these traits. A current and
comprehensive understanding of status was explored in a chapter on Interpersonal
Stratification (Fiske, 2010). Here, Fiske posits that status differs from other related
concepts because it is granted externally by those without status. Power, for example,
may be earned individually, and hierarchy can be defined by a system, but status is
uniquely a social and cultural phenomenon. Thus, Fiske suggests that status is
specifically composed of such intangible resources as “social respect, recognition,
importance, and prestige” resulting from position at the top of a social hierarchy (Fiske,
2010). Power, in contrast, has been defined as control over important outcomes and
resources such as income or social inclusion (Blader & Chen, 2012). In relation to social
justice, status may be more relevant than power as most people do not have great direct
control over the redistribution of resources, but status, especially socioeconomic status, is
both more common and more measurable, as well as central to one’s beliefs about the self
and others.
Socioeconomic status (SES), the objective measure of social class, is measured as
a combination of factors including education, income, and occupational prestige that
coalesce to represent a single concept regarding position in a social hierarchy (Saegert, et
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al., 2007). SES is unique from other markers of social status such as race, gender, and
age. All of these forms of status often have externally visible elements; SES, on the other
hand, is a more concealed form of status. Moreover, SES achieves altogether what race,
gender, and age do individually: SES separates society into defined groups that determine
specific roles, while presumably allowing for mobility between groups. Still, like race
and gender, SES falsely suggests achievement through internal factors. Although high
SES certainly can be earned through education and/or professional success, it may also be
conferred through fortunate birth, making assumptions of positive internal qualities just
as spurious.
Besides positive consequences such as access and agency, status is especially
associated with perceived competence. Indeed, surveys administered to 20 international
samples found that measures of societal status were highly correlated with perceived trait
competence (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). Part of the proliferation of using status to
infer competence and other positive qualities may lie in the ease of visually recognizing
status over traits that require effortful testing, such as ability (Fiske, 2010).
People immediately acknowledge status hierarchies through nonverbal, verbal,
and attitudinal routes. High-status people generally do (a) express freely (more
facial activity, posing skill), (b) relax more (open body, calm voice, vocal
stability), and (c) intrude more (direct gaze, closer interpersonal distance, more
interruptions, louder voices). (Fiske, 2010)
Highly visible, persons with high status are then associated with other positive qualities
that grant privilege in many ways – a process labeled status characteristics theory
(Ridgeway, 2001).
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Thus, status is perceived socially. Ridgeway & Erickson (2000) show the strength
of this status construction in studies where subjects developed shared status beliefs about
a group through nonverbal cues. In these studies, participants were all assigned to the
same group, which was supposedly paid a different amount for their participation than
another group (confederates). When participants and confederates were brought together
to make some decisions as part of the task, confederates either interacted with
participants in a “hesitant, uncertain, and deferential” manner (higher status condition) or
in a “confident, certain, and assertive” manner (lower status condition). In the higher
status condition, participants observed these nonverbal indications of their own
importance, inferred their own high status, and assumed they were paid more. In the
lower status condition, participants inferred their own inferiority and assumed they were
being paid less. In a subsequent study, the participants transferred these understandings
of status to third-party observers through their behavior. Thus, as group members are
observed to have some social advantage over others, beliefs about their deservingness are
also formed and, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, a hierarchy is established.
Once status is constructed and communicated, how is objective status maintained?
First, according to meta-analyses, ingroup bias tends to be higher among high-status
groups, and this mechanism serves to keep the same groups at the top over time
(Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, & Hume, 2001). A company’s leadership, for example,
tends to “network, attract, hire, socialize, and appreciate similar others, from job-hunting
onward” (Fiske, 2010). On a societal level, resources accorded to high SES individuals
can easily be passed on to their children and close others – legacy admissions at a
university and estate planning being prime examples. Simultaneously, the consequences
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of low status can be perpetuated by lower quality schools in low-income communities,
the health effects of chronic stress caused by limited resources, and, recently, the findings
that poverty alters the brain in ways that can affect academic success (Mani,
Mullainathan, Shafir & Zhao, 2013; Shonkoff, Boyce & McEwan, 2009; Smith, BrooksGun & Klebanov, 1997). In fact, although SES has been theoretically purported to allow
for mobility between groups, it is far more common for people to remain in their category
for generations and perpetuate inequality while also grossly overestimating the possibility
of social mobility (Causa & Johannsen, 2011; Kraus & Tan, 2011). This long-term and
pervasive establishment of the socioeconomic status hierarchy thus has consequences for
a person’s beliefs about his or her own place in society and the extent to which this
position is deserved or needs revision.
Finally, SES categories have been studied as cultural groups, with specific
behaviors and tastes distinct to upper versus low status groups that are learned and
strengthened the way other cultural markers are (Kraus, Piff & Keltner, 2011). Examples
of these markers may be physical, such as weight, behaviors, such as dental hygiene, or
tastes, such as music and fashion brands, among many others. Essentially, the objective
measure of SES generally translates into signals of status such as aesthetic preferences
and social behavior that, in turn, form the basis of the subjective experience of social
class (Kraus, Piff & Keltner, 2011).
Interestingly, measures of status differentially affect outcomes depending on
whether the measure is objective or subjective. A laboratory study of healthy women
showed that subjective perceptions of their own status were better predictors of
psychological and physiological health outcomes including stress levels, general affect,
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and heart rate (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo & Ickovics, 2000). These predictions went above
and beyond the effects of objective measures of their income and education, providing
further support for the social psychological nature of social class and its effects.
Essentially, the subjective component of social class (referred to as Subjective Social
Status, SSS) is largely rooted in social comparison, not discrete income quintiles, and
understanding of rank relative to others is a key element. Importantly, social class has
been defined as an essential part of the self, affecting everyday interactions, large
institutional and systemic processes, individual self-worth, and engagement with others
(Reay, 2005). Hereafter, mentions of social class will refer to the psychological
experience and effects of varying levels of SES and SSS.
C. Defining Social Justice and Fairness
One important aspect of social class is the reluctance many people feel to discuss
it, laden as it is with the weight of self- and others’ worth, as well as strong emotions
such as embarrassment and shame (van Eijk, 2012). Regrettably, the consequence of
class being taboo is invisibility: economic inequality can be denied, the needs of those
with low status can be ignored, and people at the bottom of the hierarchy seldom
recognize their own disadvantage and are unlikely to rally in support of change while the
income gap only increases (Sanders & Mahalingam, 2012). Nevertheless, issues of SES
are invariably related to the distribution of resources in a society – and opinions about
this from a moral perspective may be interestingly telling about the effects of status and
class on moral psychology.
Two major and competing rules for how we should allocate resources can be
referred to as fairness and social justice. Fairness involves input-based deservingness and
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results in outcomes based on proportionality. In contrast, Social Justice involves
deservingness based on common group membership and results in outcomes that are
relatively equal across the group. Fairness is based on an individual or group’s specific
effort, work, or contributions, whereas Social Justice is based in communal sharing of the
group’s resources; here a person is entitled to distributions as a member of the group
(Bharadwaj & Janoff-Bulman, in preparation).
The two rules have a moral component, as presented in the Model of Moral
Motives (MMM), (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013). In MMM, distinct moral principles
are derived by turning to a fundamental motivational distinction, approach versus
avoidance, and crossing these orientations with three foci of moral concern: the self
(intrapersonal), the other (interpersonal), and the group (collective). Approach-based
morality, or prescriptive morality, emphasizes positive, selfless behaviors, whereas
avoidance-based morality, or proscriptive morality, is restrictive and involves restraining
negative, self-interested behaviors (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). Fairness is
the result of applying the approach-based morality to the interpersonal domain. A key
extension of moral principles in the MMM involves the group-focused, or binding,
moralities, of which social justice is the component associated with prescriptive morality.
Fairness and Social Justice can easily come into conflict. The method referred to
as fairness uses input-based deservingness to allocate resources. However, resources
allotted according to individual merit can result in an unfair distribution of such resources
on the group level. Such a distribution would violate values of social justice, which allots
resources on the basis of group membership. For instance, allocating funding to schools
based on the individual incomes of students’ families would result in an unequal
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distribution of funding across schools situated in high- and low-income communities.
Allocating funding in accordance with social justice would pool money sources (e.g.,
property taxes, donations, etc.) across a city or state and would divide the proceeds
relatively equally across schools.
The past work closest to this understanding of fairness and social justice is a 1981
paper by Brickman and colleagues (Brickman, Folger, Goode, & Schul, 1981), in which
they distinguish between microjustice and macrojustice. Microjustice requires and
involves individual recipients, whereas macrojustice involves the aggregate distribution
of rewards in society. This theoretical chapter explains that in various situations, treating
individuals in accordance with microjustice may produce what seems to be an unjust
distribution of rewards among groups. Moreover, Brickman and colleagues present
evidence demonstrating that although people may initially use microjustice to make
decisions, they are unhappy when this rule results in negatively skewed distributions
across groups (Brickman, et.al., 1981). Thus, fairness is akin to Brickman et al’s (1981)
microjustice, and social justice is akin to macrojustice.
Distinguishing between these two rules of distributive justice--individual
deservingness and group-based equality--has been explored in the past more theoretically
than empirically. Sampson (1975) puts forth the concept of “justice as equality” and
suggests that “equality” and “equity” often conflict in the real world, but individual and
contextual differences may predict which is valued in any given situation. Cohen (1987)
expands on this distinction but makes a clear argument for the necessity of empirical
research as there are a number of confusing conceptual frameworks and terms that
encompass what he refers to as rules of distribution that either do or do not differentiate
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between individuals by some level of input. Wenzel (2004) picks up this thread but
emphasizes the role of group membership in his chapter dedicated to a “social
categorization approach to distributive justice” wherein two empirical studies suggest that
identifying with a subgroup predicts greater preference for equality over self-interest.
Research on social justice as a moral value is limited, but some preliminary
studies suggest that it is indeed distinct from fairness, as well as aligned with lay
understanding of the concept of social category-based equality. In an exploratory study,
Bharadwaj and Janoff-Bulman (in preparation) asked 70 college students to give
examples of fairness and unfairness or social justice and social injustice. Independent
coding revealed that when asked about fairness and unfairness, participants used more
words involving a collection of unrelated people, reciprocity, proportionality, and
specific events such as sharing the cost of a meal; when asked about social justice and
social injustice, participants used more words about people in social categories, instances
of discrimination or prejudice, ongoing phenomena such as the fight for gay marriage or
the Black Lives Matter movement, and group membership.
In another study, five-item measures of Fairness and Social Justice were
developed to assess the degree to which they may be related or orthogonal. The five-item
Fairness Scale was adapted from the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale (PMP;
Davey, Bobocel, Hing, Zanna, 1999). Five items that specifically endorsed rules for
rewarding individual contribution were chosen from the PMP to create the Fairness
Scale. The statements were rewritten to reflect groups in society and vague rewards,
rather than the original words that specified pay in a workplace environment. Examples
of statements in the Fairness Scale include: “In society, people who do a good job ought
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to rise to the top” and “The effort a person puts into something ought to be reflected in
the size of the reward he or she receives” [see Appendix A for full scale]. Participants
also completed the five-item Social Justice scale from the Model of Moral Motives
(Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013, 2014). Examples of statements in the Social Justice
Scale include “In the healthiest societies, those at the top should feel responsible for
improving the wellbeing of those at the bottom” and “It is our responsibility, not just a
matter of personal preference, to provide for groups worse off in society” [see Appendix
B for full scale]. A filler task was included between the measures of Fairness and Social
Justice: participants completed 14 items from the Carver and White’s (1994) Behavioral
Inhibition/Activation Scale. The scales were counterbalanced and administered to 202
participants: across both time points, Fairness and Social Justice scores were uncorrelated
with no order effects, suggesting that they are both independent moral values that people
can endorse simultaneously.
In general, self-interest motivations would suggest that high social class should be
associated with greater preferences for fairness over social justice when the two are in
conflict, whereas low social class would be associated with the opposite. Because this
association has not been directly tested, the following review will serve to inform the
proposed dissertation studies regarding the factors beyond self-interest that matter when
predicting the influence of social class on preferences for social justice versus fairness.
D. Social Class and Social Justice – Literature Review
1. High Social Class Predicts Low Support for Social Justice
A major theme of research on status is the desire for those with high status to
maintain their position, and for those with low status to move up in the world (Fiske,
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2010). This can be explained by the value of status, which is immediate and sociobiological in nature in that it coordinates interactions by allowing those with high status
to command attention, bind groups together, and command deference (Chance & Jolly,
1970). In the long-term and at the group level, status “opens doors,” conferring agency,
choices, resources, and the ability to impart such position to offspring and ingroup
members (Fiske, 2010).
Considering these advantages, self-interest in gaining and maintaining status should
be high and several lines of work suggest that this is indeed the case. More specifically,
research on SES and concepts associated with the distribution of resources in society
suggests that, in general, people think, feel, and act in ways that allow them and their
ingroup members to maintain status in a social hierarchy; they should, by extension, not
support social justice.
Relatively abundant resources and elevated rank afford upper-class individuals
increased control over their lives, reduced exposure to external influences, and
more personal choice, all of which promote greater independence and self-focus
(Piff, 2013).
Foremost, cognition and beliefs associated with high SES include the cognitive
simplicity of hierarchy, beliefs about deservingness, support of a meritocracy, beliefs in
essentialism, and denial of inequality in the pursuit of status, all of which are discussed
below. These characteristics of the upper class would rationally be associated with a
greater tolerance for inequality and less support for social justice over fairness as a moral
value.
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First, hierarchy (versus egalitarianism and, by association, social justice) appears
to be the cognitively simpler and more basic concept for all, regardless of social class;
hierarchical relationships are understood developmentally earlier, faster, and more easily
than egalitarian relationships (Van Berkel, Crandall, Eidelman & Blanchar, 2015). Under
several types of cognitive load, including alcohol intoxication, interfering auditory tones,
instructions against effortful thinking and ego depletion, Van Berkel, et al. (2015) found
that subjects endorsed hierarchy over egalitarianism when they didn’t have the time or
cognitive capacity to think about their responses. This effect held true for values
(participants supported power values over those of benevolence and universalism),
attitudes (participants more strongly endorsed the authority/hierarchy moral foundation
from Moral Foundations Theory, Haidt & Joseph, 2004), and behavior (participants
preferred to allocate more resources to high status groups in a laboratory activity). This
preference for hierarchy over equality would likely be heightened by higher social class,
an extension supported by Social Dominance Theory, which posits that preferring
hierarchy is a personality trait that predicts more negative attitudes towards the poor in
high-SES groups but not in low-SES groups (Pratto, et al., 2000; Bernardo, 2013).
Second, possessing high status tends to translate into beliefs about deservingness
of that status through attribution biases (Major, 1994). When people enjoy high status, it
is protective of one’s self-worth to believe one has earned this, rather than attributing
position to a random and unpredictable system (Pratto & Stewart, 2012). If position is
random, it can be taken away and doesn’t continue to confer the same advantages.
Therefore, because people are motivated to believe they (Steele, 1988) and their groups
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986) are inherently good and moral, people who believe they are high
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status generally turn to dispositional attributions and explanations based in personal merit
to explain their position in society (Kraus, Piff & Keltner, 2009). In a 2013 study,
participants’ subjective social class ranks were positively correlated with a belief in an
existing meritocracy and generalized proportional fairness; higher SES was associated
with stronger beliefs in ideas that would reinforce their own deservingness (Kraus &
Keltner, 2013). Interestingly, these effects were mediated by an increased sense of
participants’ personal control over their own life choices, suggesting that the cognitive
effects of long-term high status are based in the realities of the advantages of possessing
it.
Third, these beliefs in the meritocracy and general deservingness in the world also
lead to stronger beliefs in essentialism: the idea that the social categories people belong to
are fixed, unchangeable, have biological foundations, and can accurately represent their
members (Mahalingam, 2003). Kraus & Keltner (2013) extended essentialism scales of
other social categories (i.e. race) to develop a 10-item SES essentialism scale. Items
included “It is possible to determine one’s social class by examining their genes” and “It
is easy to figure out another person’s social class just by looking at them.” Correlational
studies with this scale and measures of subjective and objective social class revealed a
strong positive association: increased subjective (but not objective) social class was
associated with increased endorsement of both the discreteness and biological
foundations of social class categories. In addition, the authors found that beliefs in
generalized proportional fairness mediated the relationship between subjective social
class and essentialist beliefs about class categories.
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Prior research has also sought to extend intergroup theories of race and gender to
SES. However, although social class may be objectively divided into three to six discrete
groups (e.g., working poor and upper middle class), and some may believe in the
essentialism of class, most people are not aware of the details of these distinctions
(Dugan, 2012). Most importantly, while members of social classes have differing ideas
about the essentialism of their class, it is less clear whether members have strong
entitativity with other members, failing to consider the group an interdependent, coherent
unit (Lickel, 2006). Indeed, the vast majority of Americans believe themselves to be
middle class, regardless of their actual position in the socioeconomic hierarchy (Dugan,
2012). Therefore, while realistic group competition theory and group position theory
might explain how other high status groups are motivated to maintain their position, these
theories may be less applicable to socioeconomic status. The key characteristic of class,
then, is that it is rooted in more nuanced and individual social comparison, and one’s
perception of one’s own social class changes depending on whether the comparison is
being made to those above or below them.
One interesting consequence of social comparison being a large component of
social class is the overwhelming tendency of Americans to deny the current state of
income inequality. In a 2011 study, Norton & Ariely found that Americans objectively
preferred an income distribution such as Sweden’s where each quintile earns roughly the
same percentage of the national income. Then, when asked to estimate the proportion of
wealth earned by each quintile in the US, Americans vastly underestimated the earnings
of the upper quintile: respondents estimated that the rich earned 59% of the total income
of all Americans, while the reality is that they earn 84%, a 25 point difference. Moreover,
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upper class participants were even less accurate than low SES participants at estimating
income inequality in the US (Norton & Ariely, 2011). The authors theorize that this
disconnect between participants’ estimates of inequality and the actual objective reality
arises not from ignorance but from a sort of cognitive dissonance; enjoying unfair
advantage over others due to no input on one’s own part works against a need to believe
that one is good and moral. Indeed, those who feel this existential guilt are more likely to
accept their wealth was partly earned through birth and fortune. If this cognitive
dissonance is a primary motivation capable of biasing our understanding of reality, the
desire to work in opposition to a meritocracy in favor of social justice should be rare.
Furthermore, wealth, deservingness and essentialism are associated with certain
political ideologies; specifically, increased wealth and stronger beliefs in meritocracy are
associated with political conservatism, while the opposite is true of political liberalism.
However, wealth in itself interacts with political identity to predict support of policies
that perpetuate inequality. Kraus & Callaghan (2014) conducted a study of members of
Congress, taking into account their political party, personal wealth, and support for bills
that reduce inequality. As personal wealth increased, support for bills that reduce
inequality decreased, even accounting for political party pressure. In particular, the
authors found that Democrats were less likely to support bills that reduced inequality as
wealth increased, while Republicans were more consistently unsupportive.
Combined, these beliefs serve to help maintain status in the social hierarchy,
which is in the self-interest of both those who have achieved high status and those who
aim to do so. Believing that one deserves to possess his or her status and that others can

17

work to achieve the same if they were only capable also extends to a link between SES
and other kinds of moral emotions, attitudes, and behavior.
Research on SES and emotion has suggested that higher status individuals feel
and express more positive emotions (Gallo & Mathews, 2003). On the other hand, a few
studies show that because higher status individuals are less likely to engage with others
(e.g. showing less attentive behavior, less accurately reading emotions, etc.), higher
social class also predicts less empathic accuracy and compassion (Stellar, Manzo, Kraus
& Keltner, 2011). In a set of four studies, the authors showed that higher class individuals
reported less dispositional compassion across situations, less compassion in reaction to
others’ suffering, and that this link between SES and compassion was mediated by less of
a tendency to perceive context and accurately perceive distress in others as social class
increased. This relative decrease in compassion, combined with social class comparison
bias, provides two reasons higher social class would predict more tolerance of inequality:
not only are high status groups less aware of it, they are also less likely to identify the
distress of low status others and feel compassion towards their plight.
Beyond emotion, how are moral attitudes and behaviors related to SES? On a
large scale, nationwide, upper class households donate a smaller proportion of their
income to charity than do lower class households (Piff, Kraus, Cote, Cheng & Keltner,
2010). On a smaller scale, several studies have also suggested that higher social class is
associated with less prosocial behavior including generosity, charitable donations,
trusting behavior, and helping behavior – all independent of ethnicity, gender, and
religiosity (Piff, et al., 2010).
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Similarly, in one set of seven studies on SES and unethical behavior, upper class
participants were more likely to cut off other drivers or pedestrians while driving, and
more likely to report that they would engage in activities involving “unrightfully taking
or benefiting from something” (Piff, Stancato, Cote, Mendoza-Denton, Keltner, 2012).
They were also more likely to lie in a laboratory interview and cheat at a game of chance.
These effects were mediated by positive moral attitudes towards greed, and
experimentally manipulating these attitudes led to unethical behavior across class
measures.
A sample of Dutch nationals with objective measures of SES suggests an
extension of these findings and points to the content of immorality as a likely mediator of
the relationship between SES and unethical attitudes and behavior. Specifically,
Trautmann and colleagues (2013) suggest that high and low social class individuals live
in different moral matrices where the upper class care more about victimless crimes
against the community while personally harmful crimes are more tolerable. Relationship
infidelity, for example, is more acceptable to the upper class, but lying for welfare
benefits is considered more immoral. The authors suggest that these differences in moral
attitudes are related to self-interest and opportunity, pointing to a cost/benefit analysis of
morality; if roles and positions in the social hierarchy were reversed, they believe most
people wouldn’t hesitate to grasp potentially immoral opportunities to further self-interest
(Trautmann, van de Kuilen & Zeckhauser, 2013). If other kinds of moral emotions,
behaviors, and attitudes are largely motivated by self-interest among the high social class,
low support for social justice and a high tolerance for inequality should follow the same
pattern of motivation. The research on SES and deservingness, essentialism, and

19

prosociality seems to confirm the extension for those of high social class, but does the
self-interest motivation hold for those of low social class?
2. Low Social Class Predicts High Support for Social Justice
Lower socioeconomic status is generally related to a more accurate understanding
of the reality of income inequality and more support for liberal policies related to
economic redistribution (Norton & Ariely, 2001; Brandt, 2013). Thus, in keeping with
self-interest as a strong motivator, there are parallel explanations for why low
socioeconomic status should predict low tolerance for economic inequality and high
support for social justice similar to the self-interest motives of high SES individuals.
In general, research on low-income individuals and their support of equality and
redistribution is limited, and any studies that do address this group generally show
findings that are the opposite of those for high-income individuals. For example, just as
high SES is associated with stronger beliefs in, and preference for, deservingness,
meritocracy, hierarchy, and class-based essentialism, low SES is negatively associated
with all of these (Kraus & Keltner, 2013; Bernardo, 2013). Several empirical studies also
demonstrate that low social class predicts a higher dependence on contextual (vs.
dispositional) explanations of inequality and personal outcomes, and that this association
is mediated by a diminished sense of personal control (Kraus, et al., 2009). This reliance
on situational explanations stemming from the apparent lack of choices perceived by
those living in poverty may be related to the decreased emphasis on meritocracy and
class-based essentialism.
Moreover, the studies linking high SES with less prosocial emotions, attitudes,
and behavior similarly suggest that low SES is associated with higher levels of empathic
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concern, sympathy, compassion, charitable giving, and helping behavior (Piff, et al.,
2010; Stellar, et al., 2011; Piff, et al., 2012). Low SES is also related to harsher moral
judgments of harmful transgressions against the group, suggesting an intolerance for
moral violations in general when under the strain of reduced material resources (Pitesa &
Thau, 2014). International research also suggests that lower SES is related to a greater
emphasis on interdependence and relational concerns (Snibbe & Markus, 2005; Hitokoto,
2014). Thus, a decreased belief in meritocracy and class-based essentialism combined
with an increased emphasis on prosociality and interdependence would align with the
assumption that low social class would be associated with greater support for social
justice. Yet, the self-interest motive does not appear to be embraced by all when it comes
to the relationship between SES and support of social justice. The following two sections
address the various possible explanations for why those of high social class might support
social justice and why those of low social class might not.
3. High Social Class and High Support for Social Justice
As discussed, the psychological experience of high social class tends to correlate
with belief in concepts that would not support social justice. However, surveys such as
the 2015 Gallup poll consistently identify a substantial minority of high social class
individuals who apparently do support redistribution and the mitigation of socioeconomic
inequality. If believing and acting in support of social justice works against self-interest
for people of high social class, what are possible explanations for this seemingly altruistic
behavior? Not surprisingly, most of the proposed hypotheses relate to affect, in contrast
to the cerebral explanations related to self-interest. Increases in income actually predict
increases in social trust, a key component of support for social justice (Brandt, Wetherell
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& Henry, 2014). But the strongest explanations for high class predicting high support for
social justice include guilt, empathy, and anger (moral outrage), in addition to strong
helping values and the possible cognitive ease of endorsing equality across groups.
Overall, however, all of these explanations are both supported and negated by different
studies and the literature as a whole is limited, leaving a gap in the research that may be
partially filled by the psychological mediator presented at the end of this review.
First, guilt can be a strong motivator to rectify situations and existential guilt has
been proposed as an explanation for why high social class might predict less tolerance of
inequality. Existential guilt is composed of equal parts the perception that one’s
advantages were not earned and/or deserved, and the perception that one is responsible
for this inequality because one’s advantages are enjoyed at the expense of the
disadvantaged (Montada & Schneider, 1989). First proposed in the 70s to explain White
participation in the Civil Rights movement, existential guilt (along with empathy and
moral outrage) was explored in a large survey of over 800 German citizens whose
existential guilt somewhat predicted prosocial commitments (Montada & Schneider,
1989). However, empathy and moral outrage were shown to be far stronger predictors of
prosociality and intolerance of inequality, and were also highly correlated with existential
guilt, suggesting that it may be a secondary or associated emotion but not a primary
motivation.
Second, a large body of research does suggest that empathy is associated with
more prosocial behavior; consider for example, the “empathy-altruism hypothesis” in
which empathy predicts helping behavior (Batson, 1991; Eisenberg & Morris, 2001).
Specifically, empathy has been defined as an affective state associated with an ability to
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take others’ perspective and feel concerns for others in distress (Decety & Yoder, 2016).
On the trait level, specific links between empathy and social inequality are even
suggested in a “social empathy” model in which an empathic disposition allows a person
to take a group’s perspective and more “deeply understand…structural inequalities”
(Segal, 2011). However, the antecedents that predict such trait empathy are still less
understood, especially considering that wealth is negatively correlated with empathy
(Stellar, et al., 2011).
Hoffman (1990) puts forth a sequence of theories regarding the emotional
motivations for group-based prosociality associated with empathic distress over another’s
plight. He suggests that empathy for another is “cognitively extended” when a person
imagines such issues as homelessness and hunger, thereby evoking the same feelings
towards a group that one would experience if they were directly witnessing another’s
pain. Then, as long as the person feeling empathy believes either they or someone else is
at fault for this distress, empathy would serve as a “justice motive,” encouraging
rectifying large social injustices (Hoffman, 1990).
However, empathy is a complex emotion in that it also motivates attempts to
decrease one’s own very real distress – and the cognitively easiest way to do so would be
to decide the victims themselves are to blame, thereby absolving oneself of any personal
guilt or anger at a separate perpetrator who could have caused the victim’s distress.
Indeed in their model of allocation of resources, Skitka & Tetlock (1992) provide
evidence that, especially under resource scarcity, attributions of the cause of a victim’s
misfortune are paramount: participants denied aid to those whom they felt were directly
responsible for their own plight. Furthermore, empathy itself or any measure of
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dispositional empathic concern wouldn’t necessarily predict a preference for fairness or
social justice. This is because empathy requires a target and this target may vary;
empathizing with those who supposedly work hard or earn their privilege would predict
preference for fairness just as much as empathizing with those who may be
disadvantaged because of their group membership would predict preference for social
justice. Moreover, contrary to Hoffman’s assertion that sympathy is always associated
with increased prosociality, Batson (1991) asserts that without emotional self-regulation,
heightened empathic responses can result in an intense negative affective state that results
in personal distress and a focus on the self, a state that would not lead to preference for
group-based egalitarianism. Indeed, a 2008 empirical study shows that manipulating
empathy increased concern for another subject’s outcomes but did not change the
individual’s concern for outcomes related to larger egalitarian values (Lange, 2008).
Essentially, empathy for the specific needy other did not directly translate into concern
for larger social groups or more abstract societal causes. Furthermore, research on
allocations of resources showed that both self-interested egoism and inducing empathy
for a specific other resulted in equally reduced allocations to the larger ingroup, serving
as equal threats to the common good (Batson, et al., 1999). Last, some studies suggest
that people are more likely to feel empathy for those most similar to them, suggesting a
barrier to feeling empathy for those in different social groups (Hoffman, 2000).
Therefore, the question still exists: what motivates a person who feels empathy for those
suffering from social injustices to want to rectify the injustices among the group at large
rather than take any other attitude or action involving self-interest or helping a specific
needy other?
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Perhaps the answer lies with a third option: besides empathy and guilt, anger has
been shown to be a strong moral emotion with motivating properties. However, research
on moral outrage is extremely ambiguous: while some research supports moral outrage as
a unique form of anger at the violation of a moral value, several studies also show that
what is called “moral outrage” is actually not distinct from anger at personal or close
others’ distress. Moral outrage, defined as a powerful moral emotion, has been utilized in
many recent studies and positively associated with prosociality: Van de Vyver and
Abrams (2015) found that inciting “moral outrage” in relation to a wronged third-party
other predicted prosocial financial and political behavior, and Tan, Liu, Zheng and Huang
(2015) found that reduced moral outrage predicted greater intentions of corrupt behavior.
However, by experimentally manipulating conditions that should differentially produce
moral outrage and anger at personal disadvantage, O’Mara and colleagues (2011) found
that subjects only reported anger when they were themselves the victim of unfair
treatment, but not when a stranger was treated the same way. Uehara, et al. (2014)
showed that this kind of “moral outrage” was also applicable to close others and people
with whom a shared identity had been created (i.e. Japanese). Batson and colleagues
(2007) suggest that the underlying mediator is actually empathy: a similar experimental
manipulation was effective at provoking anger at unfair treatment as long as empathic
concern for the stranger had been generated experimentally first, but the concern was
both temporary and specific to the target needy other.
Beyond emotional motivations, one possible explanation for high social class
individuals’ belief in social justice lies in presuming that group-based equality is
cognitively easier and less taxing than understanding and perpetuating a hierarchy of any
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sort. However, several studies refute this claim and in fact demonstrate that endorsing a
hierarchy is the primary mode of thought, while social justice requires a “cognitive
override.” Skitka & Tetlock (1993) explored the idea that egalitarianism was a
“mindless” allocation rule, allowing people to distribute resources without attending to
need, efficiency, or attributions for cause. However, when participants were
experimentally manipulated to think deeply about allocating specific resources to a
detailed list of options, egalitarian allocations remained unchanged. This is supported by
studies showing that, under several types of cognitive load, people were more likely to
endorse values, attitudes, and behavior in line with hierarchy over egalitarianism, which
required more extensive deliberation (Van Berkel, et al., 2015).
Lastly, it may be true that rather than being driven by existential guilt, empathic
concern for similar others, or moral outrage at the violation of a moral value, high social
class individuals who endorse group-based equality are simply altruistic and strongly
believe in helping values. Although empirical research suggests that higher social class is
actually associated with less helping behavior (Piff, et al., 2010), one study linking
helping and status suggests that purposefully choosing to be the target of helping requests
was an effort to maintain high status in exchange relationships (Flynn, Reagans,
Amanatullah & Ames, 2006). This particular association may provide an explanation that
reconciles both the self-interest motivation to maintain status and the emotional
motivation to help others. In an effort to understand the underpinnings of social justice, I
analyzed a large-scale survey of over 1,000 Psychology students at a large, liberal
university in which participants completed several measures including three regarding
helping values, fairness, and social justice. Helping values included such items as “a
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decent person will go out of his or her way to help others” rated on a 9-point likert scale.
An OLS regression showed that Helping was a strong predictor of Social Justice scores
(β = .51, p < .001) and Fairness scores (β = .52, p < .001). However, importantly,
Fairness was not a significant predictor of Social Justice scores (β = .05, p = .51).
Moreover, even combined, these two variables only explained 19% of the variance in
Social Justice scores, leaving 81% unexplained by helping values. Therefore, even if
strong helping values are associated with endorsing social justice, it is not the only, nor
the majority, of the explanation for why high social class might predict greater support of
social justice.
In fact, in a conceptual paper describing several motives that drive prosociality on
a large scale, Batson and Ahmad (2002) argue that altruism, egoism, and collectivism are
all flawed in that they are often variable and temporary, as emotions tend to be, and only
emphasize a smaller ingroup worthy of help. The paper then calls for exploration of a
more inclusive, rational, and consistent moral motivation that might drive broad
prosociality besides self-interest or empathy-induced altruism. Principlism, the aim to
uphold any moral principle or value, is proposed as just such a large-scale, rational and
consistent motivation. Principlism isn’t specific to a certain person, group, or situation,
and isn’t subject to the transience of emotional motivation. Social justice could very
likely be one form of principlism. If so, this would fit with the data showing that neither
self-interest nor helping values make up the majority of social justice beliefs, and
establishes social justice as an important moral value in need of further investigation.
Still, the research on empathy and helping values leaves the question of why there are
people of high social class who support social justice against self-interest largely
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unanswered. To answer this question, a potential psychological mediator will be
presented that may help bring disparate studies and explanations together into a more
cohesive model.
4. Low Social Class and Low Support for Social Justice
First, though, the explanations for why people of low social class might not
support social justice must be addressed. If self-interest is assumed to be a primary
motivation, low social class would predict a higher intolerance of socioeconomic
inequality and an active belief in social justice as these attitudes would move towards
advantaging the self and the ingroup. However, studies show that this association is not
as strong as would be predicted, so proposed explanations for this lie in negative
emotions and stress, the cognitive simplicity of hierarchy, and System Justification
Theory.
First, a review of the relationship between socioeconomic status and health
outcomes suggests that negative emotions mediate this association; specifically, lower
class individuals are far more likely to report higher levels of depression, anxiety, anger,
hostility, and hopelessness (Gallo & Matthews, 2003). These concepts have been
integrated in the reserve capacity model in which low SES predicts decreased stressmanagement resources through psychosocial pathways, resulting in “enhanced emotional
and physiological reactivity to stress” (Gallo, 2009). The associations between low SES
and negative affect are also embodied in behavioral outcomes such as increased
interpersonal conflict and work strain (Matthews, et al., 2000). How are increased stress
and negative affect relevant to beliefs about inequality? Stress and negative emotions are
known to narrow perspective in many ways, including promotion of local (rather than
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global) processing and focus on concrete (rather than abstract) construal level
(Derryberry & Reed, 1998; Watkins, Moberly & Moulds, 2008). Stress and negative
emotions acting as cognitive load can also predict more utilitarian moral decision-making
in line with the cognitive ease of preference for hierarchy (Starcke, Polzer, Wolfe &
Brand, 2010; Van Berkel, et al., 2010). Thus, the reality of the strain of low SES might
induce a more restricted world view in which the cognitively easiest path of tolerance of
inequality is chosen for the sake of simplicity.
The systematic extension of this idea is presented as a coherent model in over
twenty years of research both supporting and critiquing System Justification Theory:
“… system justification theory proposes that people actively defend and bolster
existing social arrangements, often by denying or rationalizing injustices and
other problems, even when doing so comes at the expense of their personal and
group interests” (Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004).
Explanations for why people engage in system justification include the previously
proposed cognitive ease of hierarchy, need for structure and closure, as well as emotional
stability from justifying the status quo (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon & Sullivan, 2003).
Essentially, justifying the system and its outcomes may be one resolution to the cognitive
dissonance that arises from recognizing that the system disadvantages specific groups and
not actively fighting against it (actions costing considerable momentous effort), which
translates into passively supporting it. The consequences of system justification for
income inequality are harmful in that they predict less support for social change and
redistribution of resources, presumably by reducing “moral outrage” (Jost & Hunyady,
2005).
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Empirical support for system justification in women and racial minorities is
specific to those categories, suggesting that the ideological motivation to justify the
existing system results in an internalization of inferiority, particularly on an implicit
level. However, System Justification Theory is especially complex in the context of
socioeconomic status because, unlike race or gender, individuals can and do sometimes
experience mobility between categories and, indeed, aspiring to do so is an accepted
attitude. Group dynamics research suggests that system justification is particularly high
when ingroup ambivalence and outgroup favoritism are high, which is often the case with
low SES individuals (Jost & Burgess, 2000). Support for economic system justification
also lies in the stereotypes people hold about social class as social groups. Kay & Jost
(2003) found that activating a combination of stereotypes of “poor but happy,” “rich but
unhappy,” “poor but honest,” and “rich but dishonest” differentially increased support for
system justification.
However, research on system justification theory as it relates to socioeconomic
status, income inequality, or redistribution of resources is not as rigorous as the focus on
race or gender. There are few studies that specifically refer to economic inequality, and
those that do often make use of one or two limited measures. For example, in a 2003
survey of over 1,000 Latino-Americans in the Chicago area, participants responded to
questions about income, education, occupation, and a single item on income inequality
asking to what extent differences in pay are required as incentive for people to work hard
(Jost, et al., 2003). Although this statement was endorsed more by low-income Latinos
than high-income Latinos, the statement itself hardly represents the concept of social
justice in its entirety. Similarly, a survey of over 1,000 African-Americans suggested that

30

low SES more strongly predicted agreement with the single statement that “large
differences in income are necessary for America’s prosperity” (Jost, et al., 2003).
Although this was assumed evidence for legitimization of income inequality and reduced
support for equal wealth distribution, the single item doesn’t represent these concepts
either accurately or completely. In fact, even an accepted measure of economic system
justification used by Jost & Thompson (2000) uses items on what can be defined as
fairness (reverse-scored), social justice, and social class essentialism – three concepts that
are qualitatively different and not necessarily correlated or orthogonal.
The relative strength of system justification in high versus low SES groups
remains under debate. While Jost and colleagues maintain that system justification is
often higher among low SES individuals, Brandt (2013) presents data suggesting that, in
fact, status-legitimizing beliefs are not different depending on income, education,
occupation, or national inequality measures. However, similar to most research on SES
and SJT, Brandt only takes into account the effects of SES on legitimization of the
political system and trust in government, rather than economic systems and outcomes.
Nevertheless, in an attempt to test system justification in populations experiencing
severe global disadvantage and inequality, Henry & Saul (2006) conducted a large-scale
survey of over 400 adolescents from the poorest urban and rural areas of Bolivia, a
severely underdeveloped nation. Although the results were published as confirmatory of
system justification, the population’s characteristics and the measured variables again did
not align: while the distinctive characteristic of these subjects was their socioeconomic
disadvantage, the questions they were asked focused on the political power of the
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government rather than a far more relevant system of economic inequality. Therefore, the
question of how system justification is related to social justice is left largely unanswered.
The relationship between fairness and system justification might have more
research support. Several empirical studies demonstrate that system justifying beliefs
motivate meritocratic beliefs, suggesting that fairness principles might be preferred over
social justice in low-SES groups (Ledgerwood, Mandisodza, Jost & Pohl, 2011). In a
study of Swiss adolescents, beliefs in school meritocracy were found to be positively
related to system justification in students from low SES families, but not high
(Wiederkher, Bonnot, Krauth-Gruber & Darnon,2015). However, even if meritocracy
beliefs and consequent system justification beliefs allow low-SES groups to believe that
movement up the socioeconomic hierarchy is possible, research on social mobility (as
discussed earlier) suggests that the reality is contradictory. Perhaps system justification
measures reflect opinions about the overall proportional equity of the economic system as
it is, and fairness as a moral value measures how it should be.
System justification theory, then, is the primary existing explanation for why
people of low social class might reject social justice and, passively or not, support
inequality. However, the research on SJT and socioeconomic status appears to use
measures that are either single items or inappropriately focused on other aspects of the
system.
In sum, if self-interest is considered a primary motive, several empirical studies
support the idea that higher SES would predict less support of social justice through
beliefs in deservingness and essentialism, while lower SES would predict greater support
of social justice. However, since people at all levels of the socioeconomic hierarchy seem
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to support and oppose redistribution of resources for group-based equality, the question
remains as to why all people of high social class don’t reject social justice or why all
people of low social class don’t support it. Explanations for how high SES might still
predict support for social justice are not adequate; moral outrage may not be different
from personal distress, and empathy and helping are not the major components of social
justice. Moreover, empathy for specific needy others has not been shown to be able to be
extrapolated to large groups or causes in society, making increased contact between high
and low social class groups an unlikely explanation as well. In addition, relying on
emotional motivations for benefiting the common good has not proven effective due to
their inconstancy and tendency to be focused on the ingroup (Batson, et al, 1999). The
connection between low SES and reduced support for social justice through system
justification is similarly tenuous: measures of independent and dependent variables in the
studies examined are insufficient and do not align with the conclusions drawn.
Furthermore, the literature does not provide a single, overarching concept to explain the
mixed social justice attitudes of both the high- and low-income groups.
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CHAPTER 2
INDIVIDUATED/CATEGORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Literature Review
Although the question is undoubtedly complex, one social psychological concept
may provide a part of the cognitive basis for understanding why social class is not simply
and directly related to attitudes towards socioeconomic inequality. This concept is the
extent to which one views the self and others as individuated entities with unique abilities
or as similar members of groups who belong to social categories. Perceiving the self and
others as individuated entities would lend itself to supporting a number of other beliefs
antithetical to social justice: system justification, the protestant work ethic, a meritocracy,
more unethical behavior, less compassion for others, and a general unwillingness to work
for the common good, especially against self-interest. After all, if one is individuated, the
community or the social category is less of a relevant concept to the self and identity.
Most importantly, the individual can work within the system to succeed, reliant on only
one’s own strengths and abilities to move up the ladder of social class – a belief
supporting individual deservingness and proportional fairness over social justice. On the
other hand, perceiving the self and others as group members who belong to social
categories would be far more conducive to the support of social justice, as well as
associated prosocial attitudes and behaviors including compassion, helping values, and
ethical behavior. If one’s success is tied to the relative success of others, the community,
or the social category, then a system that engenders inequality between us cannot be
either correct or acceptable, thus increasing support of social justice.
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The most relevant support for the distinction comes from Wenzel (2004) in which
participants were more likely to favor equality in resource allocations for themselves and
others when conditions made a primary self-relevant social category salient, thereby
deindividuating potential recipients and emphasizing social categories. Compared to
other conceptualizations of equality, this research comes closest to social justice in that
prosociality and equality are achieved by not just benefiting those who have less, but
doing so by taking from those who have more.
One hypothesized extension of these results to people and social categories would
be that interdependence and social justice require similar conceptual perspectives,
thinking about the larger context and similarities with others. Several studies have used
different measures of self construals to grasp how people are thinking about individual
deservingness and group membership-based equality. In an exploratory 2007 study on
self-construal styles, results showed that manipulating an interdependent self-construal
induced stronger reactions to injustice and moral concerns (Gollwitzer, M., & Bucklein,
K., 2007).
Connecting self-construal and micro/macrojustice, Zdaniuk and Bobocel (2011)
assessed participants’ independent self-construals and found that high scores were
associated with lower endorsement of macrojustice and lower support for Affirmative
Action. We interpret Affirmative Action as a prime example of when the values of
fairness and social justice come into conflict. On the one hand, colleges aim to recruit
students who display exceptional academic merit. However, admissions policies also take
into account other considerations such as past hardship, extraneous circumstances, and,
most importantly, group membership. Making admissions decisions on individual
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deservingness and merit alone would result in a negatively skewed distribution of
admissions concentrated in groups with access to more resources. Thus interpreted from
our perspective, Zdaniuk and Bobocel (2011) found that people who defined themselves
in terms of their independence from others were less likely to use what we would
consider a social justice lens and instead relied on a fairness lens when considering
Affirmative Action.
However, the distinction between individuated or categorical thinking is probably
not limited to perceptions of people; it is more likely the case that these distinctions apply
on a deeper, cognitive level and encompass a way of thinking in general.
Thus, even on a cognitive level, research conducted in the field of construal level
theory supports the distinction made here. Construal level theory maintains that objects,
events, individuals and other concepts can all be mentally represented at either higher or
lower levels. Higher level construals are associated with abstract thinking, greater mental
distance, and overarching categorizations that see similarities and correspond to the
purpose of the representation; lower level construals are associated with concrete
thinking, specific details and differences, less structure, and correspond to the context of
a representation (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Several studies suggest that higher construal
levels and abstract mindsets are associated with greater social distance and a preference
for moral principles over situation-specific considerations (Stephen, Liberman & Trope,
2011; Eyal, Liberman & Trope, 2008). Furthermore, a higher level construal is associated
with greater group identification and seeing similarities between people (McCrea, Wieber
& Myers, 2012). Lastly, in judging moral dilemmas, an abstract/higher level perspective
taken by creating social distance appears to focus attention away from individuating
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information and specific contextual details towards categories and abstract moral
principles.
The individuated -categorical distinction may look similar to other distinctions
made in the field in relation to other domains. However, the distinction most likely
transcends cross-cultural understandings of individualism versus collectivism. Although
it may align with definitions of a collectivist culture, the distinction is probably most
useful if considered valid within cultures, existing even in Western cultures prone to
individualism. For example, a study of individualism and collectivism in Italy
demonstrated that great variance exists within Italians, and that social class and other
circumstances only partially explained the variance (Knight & Nisbett, 2007). The
distinction, first established by Markus & Kitayama (1991) as independent and
interdependent self-construals, is extended here because it refers to a perspective that
applies to situations and thinking in a general sense.
One other distinction in the social class literature that aligns with this is the
solipsism-contextualism spectrum proposed by Kraus, et al. (2012):
“…social class contexts elicit reliable social cognitive patterns among lower-class
individuals—characterized by a contextual, externally-oriented cognitive and
relational orientation to the world—and upper-class individuals—characterized by
a solipsistic, individualistic cognitive and relational orientation to the world.”
(Kraus, et al., 2012)
The authors propose, however, that contextualism and/or solipsism arise from the
realities of social class and provide several testable hypotheses based on expecting
behaviors and attitudes aligned with what appears to be self-interest within a social class.
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For example, lower class should be (and is) associated with increased empathy, increased
importance of relationships, and situational attributions (Kraus, et al., 2012). However,
no hypotheses about the effects of contextualism/solipsism on beliefs about inequality
and social justice are proposed. Furthermore, the individuated-categorical distinction is
not confined to a specific social class, like solipsism/contextualism, and, thus, is able to
answer questions about why people hold other attitudes that do not align with self-interest
according to social class, as well. For example, the individuated-categorical distinction
could explain the findings of a 2014 qualitative study of working-class women, which
suggested that a lack of material resources often predicted social isolation rather than the
connections and interdependence predicted by so many (Stephens, Cameron &
Townsend, 2014).
B. My Prior Research
In my own research, several studies support the idea that a perspective focused
on individuated information versus categorical similarities might provide a framework
with which to understand the mixed associations between social class and beliefs about
inequality.
Following the thread of individuated vs. categorical perceptions of others, a
preliminary set of studies attempted to examine the relationships between social justice,
fairness, and several existing and possibly relevant distinctions. Social Justice was
generally positively correlated with such concepts as an Interdependent Self-Construal (r
= .17, p < .05, n = 300; Singelis, 1994), Collectivism (r = .30, p < .05, n = 198; Triandis
& Gelfland, 1994), and Collective Self-Esteem (r = .12, p < .05, n = 301; Luhtanen &
Crocker, 1992). Similarly, Fairness was positively correlated with such concepts as
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Independent Self-Construal (r = .14, p < .05, n = 300; Singelis, 1994). Neither Social
Justice nor Fairness was correlated with Social & Personal Identity, (r = .10, p > .05, r = .05, p > .05, n = 197; Nario-Redmond, Biernat, Eidelman & Palenske, 2004). However,
no one concept accounted for more than 12% of the variance in Social Justice or Fairness
scores, leaving over 88% of the variance unexplained by existing concepts.
A second avenue of study attempted to manipulate individuated and group-based
thinking by asking subjects to consider either their similarities with or differences from
close others. Perhaps by activating thoughts about others in general, both primes
marginally increased participants’ sensitivity to implicit social justice violations in realworld scenarios compared to a no-prime condition. Next, a third study asked participants
to report identification with a personal strength (individual), a general group, or a specific
social category. Results involved a prime-by-individual difference interaction whereby
participants who were already high on social justice showed increased sensitivity to it
when primed with a social category, but not with a personal strength or general group.
Participants who were low on social justice were not significantly sensitive to any of the
primes. Although these studies suggest some support for the individuated-categorical
distinction, the manipulations and dependent measures require further revision to be
conclusive.
To extend the distinction to cognition, social justice was hypothesized to involve
a style of processing that promotes thinking about the “big picture.” Because Fairness is
believed to involve a restricted perspective of specific units of exchange, it was predicted
that this would be connected to a concrete cognitive framework focused on details, rather
than the big picture. Conversely, because Social Justice involves an inclusive, horizontal
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comparison across groups, it was predicted that this broader perspective would be
connected to an abstract cognitive framework. One preliminary study thus asked 322
online respondents to complete a Construal Level priming task drawn from Fujita, Trope,
Liberman, & Levin-Sagi (2006). In this task, the instructions to the participant determine
whether the task primed a concrete construal or an abstract construal level. The “abstract”
directions are to list the larger categories that define each of 20 distinct items. The
“concrete” directions are to list specific examples of the same 20 items. The control
condition did not involve any priming task. Participants also either completed the
Fairness scale or Social Justice scale utilized earlier. Participants (n = 436) were
randomly assigned to one of six conditions crossing abstract, concrete, and no-prime
construals with completion of the Fairness and Social Justice scales.
Fairness scale scores did not differ across the three priming conditions (i.e.,
abstract, concrete, and no-prime control; Ms = 5.59, 5.65, and 5.81 respectively),
F(2,223) = 1.26, p = .286. However, there was a significant difference in Social Justice
scores by prime, F(2,207) = 3.799, p = .024. Post hoc analyses (p < .05) revealed that
there were no differences between the concrete and control conditions (Ms = 5.20 and
5.17, respectively), but both differed significantly from the abstract prime condition (M =
5.67). Inducing an abstract state of mind resulted in higher endorsement of Social
Justice, compared with both concrete and no prime conditions, suggesting that Social
Justice likely involves a style of processing that promotes thinking about categorical
similarities.
In summary, while the relationship between social class and beliefs about
inequality would be expected to be simple and direct following the aims of self-interest,
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national polls and other research suggest that this is not the case. In both high and low
social class groups, a substantial minority of respondents have attitudes towards
socioeconomic inequality and redistribution that are not systematically advantageous to
them. Encompassing these attitudes about inequality and redistribution as “social justice”
– as well as a belief in proportionality and meritocracy as “fairness” – and manipulating
the psychological experience of social class through relative comparison in empirical
studies may be able to shed light on the source of the variance in the relationship between
social class and social justice. Specifically, a cognitive perspective using individuated or
categorical thinking may be the explanation for the discrepancy: perhaps thinking in
terms of abstract and categorical (rather than concrete and individuated) information is
what allows for the support for social justice across social classes.
Studies on multitasking, available cognitive capacity, and construal level suggest
that abstract thinking is more effortful and difficult to engage in over concrete thinking
(Kazakova, Cauberghe, Pandelaere, & De Pelsmacker, 2015). If engaging in abstract
thinking is more difficult, this can explain why some may not generally endorse the
principles of social justice - across social classes. This may also explain why some people
of low social class are less supportive of social justice considering the general stress
involved in the realities of low SES and the resulting relative reduction in available
processing capacity. Similarly, it may also explain why some people of high social class
are more supportive of social justice lacking as they are in those socioeconomic strains.
The following studies aimed to understand the particular relationship between
social class, beliefs in social justice and fairness, and individuated versus categorical
thinking. Specifically, the following four studies attempted to investigate if this
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individuated versus categorical perspective can contribute to understanding the complex
relationship between social class and social justice.
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CHAPTER 3
STUDIES 1 & 2
A. STUDY 1
1. Purpose
As a step towards systematically exploring the relationship between social class
and beliefs about inequality, the first two studies manipulated high and low social class
between subjects and measured the effects on support for Social Justice and Fairness.
Although national polls and correlational studies suggest generally mixed outcomes, no
empirical research has established the relationship explicitly. Manipulating social class
within the studies was intended to help establish its effects with more clarity – and help
quantify the amount of variability that will certainly exist. Second, Studies 1 and 2 also
aimed to examine how the individuated/categorical cognitive perspective is related to
social class and beliefs about social justice. Therefore, the extent to which participants
are thinking with an individuated or categorical perspective was also measured using two
eight-item measures. Studies 1 and 2 were identical except for the dependent measures
used: Study 1 utilized two five-item scales to measure support for Fairness and Social
Justice while Study 2 used ratings of ten scenarios presenting the two in conflict.
The hypothesized outcomes for Study 1 were that participants in the high social
class condition will report lower scores on the Social Justice scale (but not Fairness)
compared to participants in the control and low social class conditions, and participants in
the low social class condition will report higher scores on the Social Justice scale (but not
Fairness). Moreover, a majority of the variance in both dependent measures will be
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unexplained by the manipulation, but responses will be strongly predicted by
participants’ individuated/categorical perspective.
2. Methods
a. Participants
Participants were recruited online through Amazon Mechanical Turk from a
diverse and inclusive population in January of 2017. Although 309 participants began the
study, seven participants were excluded for incomplete responses, or if the time they took
to complete the study was more than three standard deviations above the mean
completion time (M = 5.8 minutes). Ultimately, 302 participants were randomly assigned
to one of three conditions. Participants provided informed consent and received monetary
compensation for their participation of $0.35, which reflects norms on the MTurk
platform.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 77 (M = 36.1 years, SD = 13.04). Fifty-nine
percent of the participants were female. The majority of participants described
themselves as White (76.5%), 7.9% Black, 5.3% Hispanic/Latino/a, 6% Asian/Pacific
Islander, and 2.6% multiethnic.
All participants were located in the U.S. while participating in the study, and
95.7% were born in the U.S. (12 participants were born outside of the US). In terms of
current location, 52% of participants were reporting from states that voted for a
conservative presidential candidate in the majority of the last eight elections (“red”
states); forty-eight percent of participants were located in states that voted for a liberal
presidential candidate in the majority of the last eight elections (“blue” states).
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In terms of education, 20% of participants reported having a high school degree or GED,
31% associate’s degree or some college, 32% bachelor’s degree, 15% master’s, and 2.6%
reported having completed advanced graduate work. Participants also reported household
income ranges: median reported household income range was $40,000 - $49,999, slightly
lower than the national median ($50,000 - $59,999, Census 2015).
b. Materials
1) Social Class Manipulation
Both of the first two studies operationalized the independent variable as a priming
task using a rank ladder manipulation. In this task, participants were randomly assigned
to one of three conditions: high social class, low social class, and a control condition.
Participants in all conditions were presented with an image of a ladder with ten rungs and
a description of the McArthur scale of subjective SES (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo &
Ickovics, 2000). Participants were instructed to consider the ladder a representation of
“where people stand in the United States” such that the top of the ladder represents those
who are best off – with the most money, education, respected jobs, and access to
resources – and the bottom of the ladder represents those who are worst off [see
Appendix C for full manipulation and instructions]. Similar to the manipulation
instructions in Kraus et al. (2010), participants in the high social class condition were
asked to write about a hypothetical interaction with someone at the bottom of the ladder
and participants in the low social class condition were asked to write about a hypothetical
interaction with someone at the top of the ladder. This manipulation has been used
successfully to manipulate the comparative nature of social class in relation to others in
past social psychological research by providing a strong subjective sense of
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socioeconomic status (see Piff, et al., 2010). As a manipulation check, participants were
later asked to indicate which of the ten rungs of the ladder best represented their own
position in the United States. Participants in the control condition did not write about an
interaction, but they did see the ladder’s description and indicate their perceived position.
2) Social Justice Scale
This five-item measure of social justice (α = .87) included such items as “It is
important for those who are better off to help provide resources for the most vulnerable
members of society” and “Increased economic equality is ultimately beneficial to
everyone in society.” All responses were recorded on a seven-point Likert scale with
anchors at “1” as “strongly disagree” and “7” as “strongly agree.” All participants in all
conditions responded to a randomized mix of these items and the items from the Fairness
scale.
3) Fairness Scale
This five-item measure (α = .81) was adapted from the Preference for Merit
Principle scale (Davey, Bobocel, Hing, Zanna, 1999) and included such items as “In
society, people who do a good job ought to rise to the top” and “The effort a person puts
into something ought to be reflected in the size of the reward he or she receives.” All
responses were recorded on a 7-point Likert scale with anchors at “1” as “strongly
disagree” and “7” as “strongly agree.” All participants in all conditions responded to a
randomized mix of these items and the items from the Social Justice scale.
4) Measures of Individuated/Categorical Thinking
Measuring an individuated or categorical cognitive perspective was accomplished
using two short measures: the Kimchi-Palmer figures task and the Behavior Identification
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Form (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). For the Kimchi-Palmer
figure task, eight test items asked participants to view a target figure and then choose the
most similar figure from two comparison figures (α = .96). The figures are composed of
three to four small triangles and squares that are similar to the standard figure either in
individual components or overall structural shape corresponding to local and global
processing [see Appendix E for full task]. The Behavior Identification Form (BIF)
included eight items in which a standard task was described in two ways: a higher-level
purpose-related phrase or a lower-level process-related phrase [see Appendix F for full
task]. Participants chose the phrase that best describes the standard task for them (α =
.62). For both measures, the average of higher-level figures or tasks chosen out of eight
items was calculated and served as two measures of individuated versus categorical
thinking.
c. Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a control condition (n
= 132), a high social class condition (n = 88), and a low social class condition (n = 82).
Participants first completed the rank ladder manipulation task for either high or low
social class (the control condition did not complete any task but did see the description of
the ladder) and then indicated their position on the ladder. Participants in all three
conditions then completed the five items from the Social Justice scale and the five items
from the Fairness scale in random order. An image of the SSS ladder remained on screen
to strengthen the manipulation for the experimental conditions. Then, all participants
completed the Kimchi-Palmer figure task and the BIF items. The two measures were
presented in four blocks in which items were randomized: four Kimchi-Palmer figures,

47

four BIF items, the four remaining Kimchi-Palmer figures, and then the four remaining
BIF items. Last, participants provided demographic information including age, race,
gender, political identity, religiosity, income, occupation, and educational attainment
level [see Appendix G for full demographic survey].
3. Results
a. Analytic Plan
First, to examine the effects of the social class manipulation on SSS position, and
social justice and fairness beliefs, a one-way analysis of variance was used to compare
means across participants in the three conditions. In the absence of a successful
manipulation, self-ratings of SSS position were used as a continuous measure in analyses
examining its association with social justice and fairness beliefs. Second, multiple
regression analyses examined the ability of average scores on the Kimchi-Palmer figures
task and the Behavioral Identification Form, along with SSS position, to predict social
justice and fairness beliefs. Third, post-hoc analyses included demographic variables,
especially political identity, as covariates in an attempt to explore the effect of related
(and possibly confounding) variables.
b.

Primary Analyses
Means and standard deviations for positions on the Subjective Social Status (SSS)

ladder and average scores on the Fairness and Social Justice scales are presented in Table
1. Overall, participants reported SSS positions close to the midpoint (M = 4.83, SD =
1.8), and support of Fairness (M = 5.47, SD = 1.02) was slightly higher than support of
Social Justice (M = 5.14, SD = 1.33), which had slightly greater variance. The
assumption of normality was tested using the Shapiro-Wilke statistic, which was
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significant for both Fairness and Social Justice scores (Fairness S-W statistic = .962, df =
302, p < .001; Social Justice S-W statistic = .955, df = 302, p < .001). Although
histograms and skewness statistics suggested negatively skewed data (Fairness skewness
statistic = -.62, SE = .14; Social Justice skewness statistic = -.60, SE = .14), square
transformations did not restore normality. Furthermore, several responses were extreme
but could not be considered outliers and, with no statistical or practical motivation to do
otherwise, were not removed from the sample. Therefore, where appropriate, some nonparametric tests are reported as well.
First, to test the effectiveness of the social class manipulation, a one-way analysis
of variance compared participants assigned to the three conditions (control = 0, high
social class manipulation = 1, and low social class manipulation = 2) to the measure of
relative social class (MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status, SSS) asking
participants to place themselves on a social class ladder with ten rungs from lowest to
highest. The results of this analysis were found to be statistically non-significant
(F(2,299) =.749, p = .47) indicating that the social class manipulation task was
unsuccessful at influencing participants’ report of their relative social class. In addition, a
similar ANOVA was used to analyze the effect of condition on Fairness and Social
Justice scale scores; the results of this analysis were also statistically non-significant for
both scales (Fairness F(2, 299) =.501, p = .74; Social Justice F(2, 299) =.501, p = .74)).
See Tables 2 and 3 for detailed ANOVA results and means by condition. In addition,
although the conditions differed in sample size, Levene's test indicated no violation of
homogeneity of variance (SSS: F = .81, p = .45; Fairness F = 1.56, p = .21, Social Justice
F = 1.38, p = .25).
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As the dependent variables violated assumptions of normality, a Kruskal-Wallis H
test was also conducted, which also showed that there were no statistically significant
differences in Fairness or Social Justice scores between the different conditions, Fairness
χ2(2) = .882, p = .64; Social Justice χ2(2) = .284, p = .87.
Thus, as the relative social class manipulation in each condition was unsuccessful
at manipulating either SSS position or the scale items, further analyses used participants'
reports of their SSS position on the ladder as a continuous measure of perceived relative
social class.
A Pearson product-moment correlation explored the relationship between the tenrung SSS ladder (M = 4.83, SD = 1.80), average scores on the five-item Fairness scale
(M = 5.47, SD = 1.02) and average scores on the five-item Social Justice scale (M = 5.14,
SD = 1.33). This analysis was found to be statistically significant for SSS and Social
Justice scores, r(302) = -.22, p < .001, indicating a moderate negative relationship. On the
other hand, SSS was unrelated to Fairness scores (r(302) = -.03, p = .64). Neither scores
on the eight-item Kimchi-Palmer Figures nor the eight-item Behavior Identification Form
were associated with scores on the Social Justice scale, Fairness scale, or the relative
social class measure. See Table 4 for full correlation table. A Spearman's rank-order
correlation was also run with similar results (SSS & Social Justice rs(302) = -.24, p <
.001; SSS and Fairness rs(302) = -.05, p = .38).
Next, two sets of hierarchical multiple regressions were used to examine the
efficacy of predicting Fairness scores with position on the SSS ladder and either scores
on the Kimchi-Palmer figure task or the Behavioral Identification Form (BIF). The
interaction between SSS and the cognitive measures was entered as a predictor in the
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second step, allowing the first step to remain a test of the hypothesized main effects.
However, neither of these regression equations were found to be significant (KimchiPalmer F(3, 298) =.419, p = .74; BIF F(3, 298) = 1.226, p = .30) indicating that relative
social class, the cognitive measures, and their interaction were not significant predictors
of responses to the Fairness scale. See Tables 5 and 6 for regression tables.
Two similar sets of hierarchical multiple regressions were used to examine the
efficacy of predicting Social Justice scores with positions on the SSS ladder and either
scores on the Kimchi-Palmer figure task or the Behavioral Identification Form (BIF). The
interaction between SSS and the cognitive measures was entered as a predictor in the
second step allowing the first step to remain a test of the main effects.
In the first analysis, it was found that SSS significantly predicted Social Justice (β
= -.16, p = .008), but the Kimchi-Palmer Figures did not (β = -.04, p = .94) and the
interaction was not significant (β = -.02, p = .86). The results of the regression suggested
a small effect: the full model explained only 5% of the variance (R2adjusted =.04, F(3,298)
= 5.28, p = .001). Similarly, in the second analysis, it was found that SSS significantly
predicted Social Justice (β = -.162, p < .001), but the BIF did not (β = .128, p = .68) and
the interaction was not significant (β = -.096, p = .56). Moreover, the two predictors
again independently explained only about 5% of the variance (R2adjusted = .04, F(3,298) =
5.28, p = .001). See Tables 7 and 8 for regression tables. Plots of the residuals for both
dependent variables appeared normally distributed so the results of these regressions
indicated that relative social class predicted some variance in stated Social Justice beliefs,
but the cognitive measures were not significant predictors.
c. Post-hoc Analyses
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Next, several demographic variables were explored as covariates in relation to the
Fairness and Social Justice scales. Fairness was positively associated with political
identity, r(302) = .20, p < .001. This variable was a composite measure averaging
responses to two items related to the extent to which participants’ identified with the
labels “liberal/conservative” and “Democrat/Republican” on a scale from 1 = “Not at all”
to 7 = “Very.” Conversely, political identity was negatively associated with Social
Justice beliefs, r(302) = -.48, p < .001. Social Justice was also negatively associated with
objective household income range, r(302) = -.15, p = .009. Relative social class (SSS)
was positively associated with age (r(301) = .12, p = .04), income (r(302) = .53, p <
.001), conservative political identity (r(302) = .17, p = .004), and education (F(7,294) =
7.46, p < .001) across 8 increasingly greater education levels. No significant differences
in the dependent variables were seen across gender, ethnicity, or state political identity
(i.e. "red" state or "blue" state based on how the state had voted in the majority of the last
eight presidential elections). In sum, of the seven demographic variables explored, three
(political identity, household income range, and education) seemed most relevant and
influential to the dependent variables of relative social class, Fairness, and Social Justice.
See Table 4 for full correlations table.
Accordingly, first, the relationship between SSS position and social justice beliefs
was subjected to a first-order partial correlation in order to explore the relationship
controlling for the effects of education, income, and political identity. The first-order
correlation was found to be statistically significant, r(297) = -.12, p = .045, indicating that
a relationship between the two is slightly weakened but exists above and beyond the
effects of education, income, and political identity. See Table 9 for correlations table.
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Second, because Political Identity had the strongest pattern of association with all
three variables, a one-way analysis of covariance compared participants assigned to the
three conditions to the measure of relative social class, controlling for the covariate
effects of political identity. This analysis was also found to be statistically non-significant
(F(2,296) =.528, p = .59) indicating that the social class manipulation task was
unsuccessful at influencing participants’ report of their relative social class even after
controlling for the influence of political identity. Furthermore, a similar one-way analysis
of covariance also indicated that neither Fairness scores nor Social Justice scores varied
across conditions after controlling for political identity, (Fairness F(2, 294) = 1.51, p =
.22; Social Justice F(2, 294) = .965, p = .38).
Third, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to test if SSS position,
political identity, and the interaction between the two could significantly predict
participants' endorsement of Social Justice. It was found that SSS significantly predicted
Social Justice (β = -.12, p = .002), as did political identity (β = -.34, p < .001) but the
interaction was not significant (β = .017, p = .41), see Table 10 for details. The results of
the regression also indicated that the model explained a moderate 25.5% of the variance
(R2adjusted =.247, F(3,297) = 33.89, p <. 001).
As political identity and SSS were positively correlated (r(302) = .17, p = .004), a
mediation model was explored to attempt to represent a more accurate picture of how the
two variables were related to Social Justice. Results of the analysis showed that the
relationship between relative social class and social justice beliefs was only partially
mediated by political identity. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the standardized regression
coefficient between relative social class and political identity was statistically significant
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(β = .16), as was the standardized regression coefficient between political identity and
social justice beliefs (β = -.35). The standardized indirect effect was -.08, CI [-.13, -.03].
The significance of this indirect effect was tested using bootstrapping procedures.
Unstandardized indirect effects were computed for each of 10,000 bootstrapped samples,
and the 95% confidence interval was computed by determining the indirect effects at the
2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was -.06,
and the 95% confidence interval ranged from -.10 to -.02. However, political identity as
the mediator could only account for about a third of the total effect, PM = .34.
Last, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to test if SSS position,
political identity, and the interaction between the two could significantly predict
participants' endorsement of Fairness. It was found that only (increasingly conservative)
political identity was a significant predictor (β = .12, p < .001), see Table 11 for
regression table. The results of the regression also indicated that the model only
explained a small 4.6% of the variance (R2adjusted =.036, F(3,297) = 4.73, p = . 003).

B. STUDY 2
1. Purpose
As the next step towards systematically exploring the relationship between social
class and beliefs about inequality, the second study also manipulated high and low social
class between subjects and measured the effects on support for Social Justice and
Fairness. However, Study 2 differed from Study 1 as it measured these beliefs using
ratings of two sets of hypothetical real-world scenarios rather than scale items. Although
items from scales provide a more direct way of measuring beliefs, real-world scenarios
can be presented without politicized language that may confound the results. Moreover,
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the scenarios were designed to present conflict between the two values allowing
acceptability ratings to serve as a measure of the extent to which participants would
uphold one value at the expense of the other.
The hypothesized outcomes were that participants in the high social class
condition would report higher acceptability of the Fair but Unjust scenarios and lower
acceptability of the Socially Just but Unfair scenarios compared to participants in the
control and low social class conditions, and participants in the low social class condition
would report lower acceptability of the Fair but Unjust scenarios and higher acceptability
of the Socially Just but Unfair scenarios. Moreover, similar to Study 1, a majority of the
variance in both dependent measures will be unexplained by the manipulation, but
participants’ individuated/categorical perspective will be a strong predictor.
2. Methods
a. Participants
Participants were again recruited online from a diverse and inclusive population
through Amazon Mechanical Turk in January of 2017, and were screened to ensure they
had not completed the prior study. Although 304 participants began the study, nine
participants were excluded for incomplete responses, or if the time they took to complete
the study was more than three standard deviations above the mean completion time (M =
6.8 minutes). Ultimately, 296 participants were randomly assigned to one of three
conditions. Participants provided informed consent and received monetary compensation
for their participation of $0.45, which reflects norms on the MTurk platform.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 82 (M = 36.2 years, SD = 11.69). Fifty-five
percent of the participants were female. The majority of participants described
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themselves as White (76.7%), 7.1% Black, 5.4% Hispanic/Latino/a, 8.8% Asian/Pacific
Islander, and 2% multiethnic.
All participants were located in the U.S. while participating in the study, and
94.3% were born in the U.S. (16 participants were born outside of the US). In terms of
current location, 56% of participants were reporting from states that voted for a
conservative presidential candidate in the majority of the last eight elections (“red”
states); forty-four percent of participants were located in states that voted for a liberal
presidential candidate in the majority of the last eight elections (“blue” states).
In terms of education, 17% of participants reported having a high school degree or
GED, 30% associate’s degree or some college, 37% bachelor’s degree, 12.5% master’s,
and 3.4% reported having completed advanced graduate work. Participants also reported
household income ranges: median reported household income range was $50,000 $59,999, similar to the national median ($50,000 - $59,999, Census 2015).
b. Materials
1) Social Class Manipulation
All participants completed the same social class manipulation from Study 1 and
again indicated their relative social class position on the ten-rung ladder representing
Subjective Social Class.
2) Social Justice & Fairness Scenarios
Study 2 used acceptability ratings (from 1 to 7, 1 = “not at all acceptable” and 7 =
“very acceptable”) of hypothetical scenarios as the dependent variable rather than the
scale items. Each of the 10 scenarios pitted fairness and social justice values against each
other such that they showcase instances where input-based deservingness rules create a
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skewed distribution across groups (five scenarios α = .81), or instances where rules that
support group membership-based equality violate individual deservingness (five
scenarios α = .74). All of the scenarios were personally developed and tested for
reliability by the researcher. They were originally inspired by Rob Reich’s example of the
drawbacks of a seemingly moral act (parents donating to their child’s public school)
(Reich, 2013).
An example of a Fairness scenario is:
“In a city neighborhood, parents donate a great deal of money to their children’s public
school. Other public schools in the city with lower income families get no additional
funds from parents. How acceptable is it that parents donate a great deal of money to
their children’s school?”
An example of a Social Justice scenario is:
“Students at a major university are admitted based on a combination of factors, including
academic achievement, past hardship, and group membership. Some students with better
academic records are not admitted to the university. How acceptable is it that students at
a major university are admitted based on a combination of factors?”
[See Appendix D for a list of all scenarios]
3) Measures of Individuated/Categorical Thinking
Participants completed the same items from both the Kimchi-Palmer figures task
(eight items, α = .96) and the Behavioral Identification Form (eight items, α = .70) from
Study 1.
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c. Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a control
condition (n = 123), a high social class condition (n = 82), and a low social class
condition (n = 91). Participants first completed the rank ladder manipulation task for
either high or low social class (the control condition did not complete any task but did see
the description of the ladder) and then indicated their position on the ladder. Participants
in all three conditions then provided acceptability ratings for all ten scenarios in random
order. An image of the ladder remained on screen to strengthen the manipulation for the
experimental conditions. Participants’ responses were scored in two ways: a combined
score of acceptability of all of the scenarios where the Fairness scores were reversescored, and a two-part score of acceptability for each type of scenario. However, the
mixed scenario scoring had lower reliability (α = .59) and the two sets of scenarios
appeared to be distributed differently so analyses used two separate scores for each set of
scenarios. Last, all participants completed the Kimchi-Palmer figure task and the BIF
items similar to Study 1, and provided demographic information including age, race,
gender, political identity, religiosity, income, occupation, and educational attainment
level [see Appendix G for full demographic survey].
3. Results
a. Analytic Plan
First, to examine the effects of the social class manipulation on SSS position, and
ratings of social justice and fairness scenarios, a multivariate one-way analysis of
variance was used to compare means across participants in the three conditions. In the
absence of a successful manipulation, self-ratings of SSS position were used as a
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continuous measure in analyses examining its association with scenario ratings. Second,
multiple regression analyses examine the ability of average scores on the Kimchi-Palmer
figures task and the Behavioral Identification Form, along with SSS position, to predict
scenario ratings. Third, post-hoc analyses included demographic variables, especially
political identity, as covariates in an attempt to explore the effect of related (and possibly
confounding) variables.
b. Primary Analyses
Means and standard deviations for positions on the Subjective Social Status (SSS)
ladder and average ratings of the Fair but Socially Unjust (FUJ) and Socially Just but
Unfair (JUF) scenarios are presented in Table 12. Overall, participants reported SSS
positions at the midpoint (M = 5.00, SD = 1.7), and support of Socially Just but Unfair
scenarios (M = 3.79, SD = 1.19) was slightly higher than that of Fair but Unjust scenarios
(M = 3.41, SD = 1.31), which had slightly greater variance. The assumption of normality
was tested using the Shapiro-Wilke statistic, which was significant for both FUJ and JUF
ratings (Fairness S-W statistic = .974, df = 296, p < .001; Social Justice S-W statistic =
.989, df = 296, p = .02). However, histograms and skewness statistics suggest that the
data does not depart egregiously from normality (FUJ skewness statistic = -.52, SE = .14;
JUF skewness statistic = .04, SE = .14), and square transformations do not result in great
changes in the distributions.
First, to test the effectiveness of the social class manipulation, a one-way analysis
of variance compared participants assigned to the three conditions (control = 0, high
social class manipulation = 1, and low social class manipulation = 2) to the measure of
relative social class (MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status, SSS) asking
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participants to place themselves on a social class ladder with ten rungs from lowest to
highest. The results of this analysis were found to be statistically non-significant
(F(2,293) =.813, p = .45) indicating that the social class manipulation task was again
unsuccessful at influencing participants’ report of their relative social class. In addition,
as the scenarios were correlated (r(296) = .19, p = .001) and both types included elements
of both Fairness and Social Justice, a multivariate one-way analysis of variance
(MANOVA) was used to analyze the effect of condition on ratings of both sets of
scenarios. The results of this analysis were also statistically non-significant overall (F(4,
586) = 1.873, p = .11). See Tables 13 and 14 for detailed ANOVA tables. In addition,
although the conditions differed in sample size, Levene's test indicated no violation of
homogeneity of variance (SSS: F = .09, p = .91; Fairness F = .47, p = .63, Social Justice F
= .31, p = .74).
Thus, as the relative social class manipulation in each condition was largely
unsuccessful at manipulating the SSS position and ratings of most scenarios, further
analyses used participants' reports of their SSS position on the ladder as a continuous
measure of perceived relative social class.
A Pearson product-moment correlation explored the relationship between the tenrung SSS ladder, average ratings of the five Just but Unfair scenarios, and average ratings
of the five Fair but Unjust scenarios. This analysis was found to be statistically
significant for SSS and JUF scenarios, r(296) = -.12, p = .04, indicating a small negative
relationship. SSS was positively related to FUJ scenarios (r(296) = .19, p = .001). Scores
on the eight-item Kimchi-Palmer Figures task were not correlated with any other
dependent variables, but the eight-item Behavior Identification Form was negatively
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associated with ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios (r(296) = -.14, p = .014). See Table
15 for full correlations table.
Next, two sets of hierarchical multiple regressions were used to examine the
efficacy of predicting Socially Just but Unfair (JUF) ratings with position on the SSS
ladder and either scores on the Kimchi-Palmer figure task or the Behavioral Identification
Form (BIF). The interaction between SSS and the cognitive measures was entered as a
predictor in the second step to allow the first step to remain a model with only main
effects. In the first regression analysis, it was found that SSS was a marginally significant
predictor of JUF ratings (β = -.08, p = .05), but the Kimchi-Palmer Figures task was not
significant (β = -.12, p = .43) and the interaction was not significant (β = -.05, p = .63).
The results of the regression suggested a very small effect: the full model explained only
1.7% of the variance (R2adjusted =.007, F(3,292) = 1.71, p = .17). Similarly, in the second
regression analysis, it was found that SSS significantly predicted Just but Unfair
scenarios (β = -.08, p = .048), but the BIF did not (β = -.36, p = .18) and the interaction
was not significant (β = -.15, p = .35). Again, SSS and the BIF accounted for very little of
the variance in JUF ratings (R2adjusted =.013, F(3,292) = 2.34, p = .07). See Tables 16 and
17 for regression tables.
Two similar sets of hierarchical multiple regressions were used to examine the
efficacy of predicting Fair but Socially Unjust scores with positions on the SSS ladder
and either scores on the Kimchi-Palmer task or the Behavioral Identification Form (BIF).
The interaction between SSS and the cognitive measures was entered as a predictor in the
second step.
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It was found that SSS significantly predicted FUJ ratings (β = .14, p = .001), but
the Kimchi-Palmer Figures did not (β = -.078, p = .65) and the interaction was not
significant (β = -.06, p = .55). The results of the regression suggested a small effect: the
two predictors independently explained only 3.8% of the variance (R2adjusted =.028,
F(3,292) = 3.85, p = .01).
Interestingly, in the models including the BIF, it was found that SSS again
significantly predicted FUJ ratings (β = .15, p = .001), but the BIF did as well (β = -.78, p
= .007). The interaction was not significant (β = -.18, p = .30), indicating that the main
effects of relative social class and construal level as measured by the BIF were
statistically significant predictors of acceptability of Fair but Socially Unjust scenarios.
The regression equation for predicting acceptability of Fair but Unjust scenarios from
relative social class and construal level as measured by the BIF was found to be Y = .15x1
- .78x2 + 3.07. Overall, however, this model only accounted for 6.4% of the variability
(R2adjusted =.054, F(3,292) = 3.85, p = .01), suggesting that an exploration of other related
variables is warranted. See Tables 18 and 19 for regression tables.
c. Post-hoc Analyses
Next, several demographic variables were explored as covariates in relation to the
ratings of scenarios. Acceptability of Socially Just but Unfair scenarios was negatively
associated with political identity, r(296) = -.27, p < .001. The "political identity" variable
was a composite measure averaging responses to two items related to the extent to which
participants’ identified with the labels “liberal/conservative” and “Democrat/Republican”
on a scale from 1 = “Not at all” to 7 = “Very.” Conversely, political identity was
positively associated with acceptability of Fair but Socially Unjust scenarios, r(296) =
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.42, p < .001. FUJ scenarios were also positively associated with objective household
income range, r(296) = .20, p < .001, and differed across gender with males slightly more
approving (mean difference = .45, t(292) = 2.95, p = .003). As can be expected, relative
social class (SSS) was positively associated with income (r(296) = .56, p < .001),
conservative political identity (r(302) = .13, p = .02), and education (F(7,288) = 3.14, p =
.003) across 8 increasingly greater education levels. See Table 15 for correlations table.
In sum, of the seven demographic variables explored, three (political identity, household
income range, and education) again seemed most relevant and influential to the
dependent variables of relative social class, Fairness, and Social Justice.
The relationship between relative social class and acceptability ratings of the two
sets of scenarios was subjected to two first-order partial correlations in order to explore
the relationships controlling for the effects of education and political identity. When
education level is controlled for, the first-order correlations between relative social class
and both sets of scenarios remain statistically significant (JUF r(293) = -.13, p = .025;
FUJ r(293) = .21, p < .001). However, when political identity is controlled for, only the
first-order correlation between relative social class and Fair but Socially Unjust scenarios
remains statistically significant (JUF r(293) = -.09, p = .13; FUJ r(293) = .15, p = .01; see
Table 20).
Second, because political identity had the strongest pattern of association with all
three variables, one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) compared participants
assigned to the three conditions on the measure of relative social class and a MANCOVA
compared them on acceptability of both sets of scenarios, while controlling for the effects
of political identity. The ANCOVA on condition and SSS position was not found to be
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statistically significant (F(2,290) = .84, p = .43), indicating that the social class
manipulation task was not successful at influencing relative social class, even after
controlling for the influence of political identity. The MANCOVA was, however,
marginally significant for univariate tests of condition on both sets of scenarios (JUF
F(2,290) = 2.42, p = .09; FUJ F(2,290) = 2.47, p = .09). See Tables 21 and 22 for details.
Third, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to test if SSS and
political identity could significantly predict participants' acceptability ratings of Socially
Just but Unfair scenarios. Their interaction was entered in the second step. It was found
that political identity significantly predicted JUF (β = -.19, p < .001), but SSS did not (β
= -.06, p = .13), see Table 23 for details. The interaction was not significant (β = .004, p =
.89). The results of the regression also indicated that this model explained only 8.2% of
the variance (R2adjusted =.07 F(3,292) = 8.66, p < .001).
Similarly, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to test if SSS,
political identity, and the BIF could significantly predict participants' acceptability ratings
of Fair but Unjust scenarios. Their two- way interactions were entered in the second step.
Gender and the dummy-coded conditions were also included as main effects. It was
found that SSS significantly predicted FUJ (β = .11, p = .009), as did political identity (β
= .31, p < .001), and the BIF (β = -.74, p = .004). Moreover, gender (β = -.44, p = .001)
and only the low social class manipulation condition (compared to the control) were also
significant predictors (β = -.39, p = .015). However, the interactions were not significant
(see Table 24 for details). The results of the regression also indicated that full model
explained a moderate 26.3% of the variance (R2adjusted =.24 F(10,283) = 10.08, p < .001).
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As political identity and SSS were positively correlated (r(296) = .13, p = .02), a
mediation model was explored to attempt to represent a more accurate picture of how the
two variables were related to ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios. Results of the analysis
showed that the relationship between relative social class and social justice beliefs was
only partially mediated by political identity. As Figure 2 demonstrates, the standardized
regression coefficient between relative social class and political identity was statistically
significant (β = .13, p = .02), as was the standardized regression coefficient between
political identity and social justice beliefs (β = .32, p < .001). The standardized indirect
effect was -.05, CI [.01, .10]. The significance of this indirect effect was tested using
bootstrapping procedures. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was .04, and
the 95% confidence interval ranged from .008 to .08. However, political identity as the
mediator could only account for about a third of the total effect, PM = .28.
4. Discussion of Studies 1 & 2
In Study 1, relative social class manipulations were unsuccessful at influencing
participants’ position on the Subjective Social Status ladder scale measure and the
Fairness and Social Justice scales, even when controlling for the effects of participant
political identity. In Study 2, the manipulation was again unsuccessful at influencing both
participants’ SSS position and average ratings of scenarios presenting conflict between
fairness and social justice. Although the task has been used successfully in past research
and was replicated in identical detail in these studies, it may be that for the purposes of
these studies, writing about interactions with people at the top or bottom of the SSS
ladder is not a sufficiently influential activity to replace participants’ prior perceptions of
their social class.
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However, relative social class, as measured by SSS position, was a significant
negative predictor of endorsement of stated social justice principles but not fairness
principles in Study 1, which supported the hypotheses indirectly. In Study 2, this pattern
was expanded upon in that SSS did not significantly predict acceptability of scenarios
where social justice was upheld, but it did negatively predict acceptability of scenarios
where social justice was violated. That is, the lower in social class people consider
themselves overall, the more supportive of Social Justice they are, and they are especially
more sensitive to violations of social justice. Furthermore, although conservative political
identity and relative social class were positively associated, only about a third of this
effect of social class could be explained by political identity. Moreover, the effects of
relative social class were associated with Social Justice beliefs even beyond the effects of
related demographic variables such as political identity, education, and household income
range.
Politics was, however, a strong independent predictor of both the scale items and
the scenarios in both studies. Interestingly, conservative political identity was a stronger
negative predictor of the scale items (R2 = 25%) than of the Socially Just but Unfair
scenario ratings (R2 = 8%). Perhaps political identity is more relevant to stated attitudes
than to upholding Social Justice when in conflict with Fairness in real-world scenarios.
In terms of cognition, the Kimchi-Palmer local-global task was not able to add to
the understanding of social justice and fairness. The Behavior Identification Form
measuring high and low construal level did negatively predict the acceptability of Fair
but Socially Unjust scenarios. Essentially, participants who were thinking at a higher,
more abstract level were significantly more likely to object to the violation of social
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justice. The two cognitive measures are intended to measure related but separate
concepts: local/global thinking and higher/lower construal levels. It may be that, for the
purposes of this research, the BIF is a more relevant measure of cognition.
Lastly, this objection to violations of social justice was predicted by several
variables independently of each other. These included higher level thinking from the BIF,
a more liberal political identity, lower relative social class, being asked to write about an
interaction with someone higher in social class (condition 2), and being female. The
effect of the low social class condition is not, however, mediated by any change in SSS
position. Therefore, it remains to be understood what effect this manipulation is actually
having: is the experience of writing about someone who is worse off than you generating
an emotional reaction such as empathy or general negative affect?
Interestingly, the gender effect, although small, is robust - but has not been seen
in previous studies and was not mediated by politics, nor was it associated with other
demographic variables. This result may also suggest that future research should more
closely examine the role of two other concepts that are also affected by gender: empathy
and interdependence (Varnum, Blaise, Hampton & Brewer, 2015).
Overall, Studies 1 and 2 suggest that social class has a unique but small effect on
the extent to which people believe in and support social justice - but not on thinking
about fairness, which remains a fairly universal value. Abstract thinking appears to play
an independent role in objecting to the violation of social justice principles, but not
fairness principles.
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CHAPTER 4
STUDIES 3 & 4
A. STUDY 3
1. Purpose
In Studies 1 and 2, the effects of high and low social class on support for Social
Justice and Fairness were explored with cognitive perspective not manipulated, but
measured. In Study 3, the effects of manipulated individuated or categorical cognitive
perspective on support for Social Justice and Fairness were examined, and social class
was measured. In this way, Study 3 aimed to test the individuated/categorical cognitive
perspective as a predictor of support for Social Justice (and Fairness). Study 3 asked
participants to use a concrete/individuated perspective or an abstract/categorical
perspective, and then measured their attitudes using the Social Justice and Fairness
scales. Study 4 was different only in that the dependent measure was the ten scenarios
used in Study 2. The hypothesized outcome in Study 3 was that compared to the control
group, participants primed with a concrete/individuated perspective would have lower
scores on the Social Justice measures but not Fairness, and participants primed with an
abstract/categorical perspective will show higher support of Social Justice but not
Fairness.
2. Methods
a. Participants
Participants were again recruited online from a diverse and inclusive population
through Amazon Mechanical Turk in January of 2017, and were screened to ensure they
had not completed the prior studies. Although 310 participants began the study, 15
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participants were excluded for incomplete responses, or if the time they took to complete
the study was more than three standard deviations above the mean completion time (M =
5.3 minutes). Ultimately, 295 participants were randomly assigned to one of three
conditions. Participants provided informed consent and received monetary compensation
for their participation of $0.35, which reflects norms on the MTurk platform.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 74 (M = 39.2 years, SD = 13.1).
Approximately 50.5% of the participants were female. The majority of participants
described themselves as White (75.9%), 9% Black, 3.8% Hispanic/Latino/a, 9%
Asian/Pacific Islander, and 2.4% multiethnic.
All participants were located in the US while participating in the study, and 95%
were born in the US (16 participants were born outside of the US). In terms of current
location, 53% of participants were reporting from states that voted for a conservative
presidential candidate in the majority of the last eight elections (“red” states); forty-seven
percent of participants were located in states that voted for a liberal presidential candidate
in the majority of the last eight elections (“blue” states).
In terms of education, 16.5% of participants reported having a high school degree
or GED, 31.6% associate’s degree or some college, 35.7% bachelor’s degree, 11%
master’s degree, and 5.2% reported having completed advanced graduate work.
Participants also reported household income ranges: median reported household income
range was $50,000 - $59,999, similar to the national median ($50,000 - $59,999, Census
2015).
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b. Materials
1) Individuated/Categorical Perspective Manipulation
Participants in experimental conditions completed one of the versions of the
Construal Level priming task drawn from Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi (2006).
This manipulation proved successful in a past study at affecting support for Social Justice
(described above), although that study did not incorporate social class or the necessary
analyses and, therefore, will be extended here. In this task, the instructions to the
participant determine whether the task primes a concrete construal or an abstract
construal level. The “abstract” directions are to list the larger categories that define each
of 20 distinct items. The “concrete” directions were to list specific examples of the same
20 items. Participants in the control condition were simply asked to read the list of 20
items [see Appendix H for full task stimuli and directions].
2) Social Justice and Fairness Measures
Unique insights were provided by the measures and scenarios, so both dependent
measures were utilized in Studies 3 and 4. For Study 3, participants completed the same
five-item Social Justice scale (α = .91) and the five-item Fairness scale (α = .82) in
random order as used in Study 1.
3) Social Class Measures
Participants saw the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status used in the
previous two studies. A description of the ladder and its ten rungs as representing society
was provided and participants were asked to indicate which of the ten rungs might best
represent their social class position in US society from 1 - “Worst off” to 10 - “Best off.”
4) Measures of Individuated/Categorical Thinking
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Participants completed the first four items from both the Kimchi-Palmer figures
task (four items, α = .92) and the Behavioral Identification Form (four items, α = .55)
from the previous studies.
c. Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in (3x1):
concrete/individuated perspective (n = 86), abstract/categorical perspective (n = 82), and
a control condition (n = 127). Participants first completed the cognitive perspective
manipulation task (the control condition did not complete any task but saw the list of
words). Participants in all three conditions then completed the Social Justice/Fairness
scale items in random order. Then, participants completed the four-item Kimchi-Palmer
task, then the four-item BIF. Lastly, all participants provided demographic information
including the SSS ladder measure, age, race, gender, political identity, religiosity,
income, occupation, and educational attainment level [see Appendix G for full
demographic survey].
3. Results
a. Analytic Plan
First, to examine the effects of the construal level task on social justice and
fairness beliefs, a one-way analysis of variance was used to compare means across
participants in the three conditions. Second, multiple regression analyses examined the
ability of average scores on the Kimchi-Palmer figures task and the Behavioral
Identification Form, along with measured SSS position, to predict social justice and
fairness beliefs. Third, post-hoc analyses included demographic variables, especially
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political identity, as covariates in an attempt to explore the effect of related (and possibly
confounding) variables.
b. Primary Analyses
Means and standard deviations for positions on the Subjective Social Status (SSS)
ladder and average scores on the Fairness and Social Justice scales are presented in Table
25. Overall, participants reported SSS positions close to the midpoint (M = 5.05, SD =
1.82), and support of Fairness (M = 5.22, SD = 1.00) was slightly higher than support of
Social Justice (M = 5.08, SD = 1.37), which had slightly greater variance. The
assumption of normality was tested using the Shapiro-Wilke statistic, which was
significant for both Fairness and Social Justice scores (Fairness S-W statistic = .975, df =
295, p < .001; Social Justice S-W statistic = .959, df = 295, p < .001). Although
histograms and skewness statistics suggested negatively skewed data (Fairness skewness
statistic = -.40 SE = .14; Social Justice skewness statistic = -.39, SE = .14), square
transformations did not restore normality. Furthermore, several dozen responses,
although extreme, could not be considered outliers and, with no statistical or practical
motivation to do otherwise, were not removed from the sample. Therefore, where
appropriate, some non-parametric tests are reported as well.
First, to test the effectiveness of the construal level manipulation, a one-way
analysis of variance compared participants assigned to the three conditions (control = 0,
concrete construal level manipulation = 1, and abstract construal level manipulation = 2)
to the Fairness and Social Justice scale scores. The results of this analysis were found to
be statistically non-significant (Fairness F(2,292) = 1.79, p = .17; Social Justice F(2,292)
= .76, p = .47) indicating that the construal level manipulation task was unsuccessful at
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influencing participants’ endorsement of the Fairness and Social Justice scales. See
Table 26 for detailed ANOVA results. In addition, although the conditions differed in
sample size, Levene's test indicated no violation of homogeneity of variance (Fairness
Levene’s Statistic = 1.16, p = .32; Social Justice Levene’s Statistic = .82, p = .44).
As the data violated assumptions of normality, two (nonparametric) KruskalWallis H tests were also conducted, which again showed that there were no statistically
significant differences in Fairness or Social Justice scores between the different
conditions, Fairness χ2(2) = 2.91, p = .23; Social Justice χ2(2) = .199, p = .37.
Next, a (nonparametric) Spearman's rank-order correlation explored the
relationship between the ten-rung SSS, which was gathered at the end with demographic
information, and average scores on the five-item Fairness and Social Justice scales with
different results although in the expected directions. With this analysis, SSS and Social
Justice were significantly negatively correlated (rs(295) = -.12, p = .04) while Fairness
was not significantly correlated with SSS, rs(295) = .09, p = .13), see Table 28 for full
correlation table.
As a baseline measure, the first four items from the BIF and the Kimchi-Palmer
figures task were also presented to participants at the end of the study. Possibly because
they were presented at the end of study when the effects of the priming task may have
worn off, neither of these measures differed by condition (FKP(2,292) = .13, p = .88;
FBIF(2,292) = .91, p = .41). Similar to Studies 1 and 2, these were used along with SSS
position to attempt to predict Fairness and Social Justice scores. Specifically, as the
previous studies suggested that the BIF is most relevant to the variables studied, the
average score of this and the ten-rung SSS measure were entered into a hierarchical
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multiple regression with their interaction entered in the second step. The residuals for
both of these regressions appeared normally distributed. It was found that neither SSS,
the BIF, nor their interaction were significant predictors of Social Justice scores (R2 =
.01, F(3,291) = 1.25, p = .29), see Table 29 for regression table. However, the regression
analysis did suggest that Fairness scores can be predicted by SSS position (β = .07, p =
.041) but not by the BIF (β = .20, p = .30) or their interaction (β = -.10, p = .35), see
Table 30 for regression table. The model could only predict about 2% of the variance in
Fairness scores (R2adjusted = .011, F(3,291) = 2.13, p = .10).
c. Post-hoc Analyses

Several demographic variables were then explored in relation to the Fairness and
Social Justice scales using nonparametric Spearman’s rank correlations (see Table 28).
Fairness was positively associated with political identity, rs(295) = .23, p < .001. This
variable was a composite measure averaging responses to two items related to the extent
to which participants’ identified with the labels “liberal/conservative” and
“Democrat/Republican” on a scale from 1 = “Not at all” to 7 = “Very.” Conversely,
political identity was negatively associated with Social Justice beliefs, rs(295) = -.55, p <
.001. Social Justice was also negatively associated with objective household income
range, rs(295) = -.15, p = .013. As hypothesized, relative Social Class (SSS) was
positively associated with income (rs(295) = .62, p < .001), conservative political identity
(rs(295) = .17, p = .003), and education (F(7,283) = 8.51, p < .01) across 8 increasingly
greater education levels. No significant differences in the dependent variables was seen
across gender, ethnicity, or state political identity (i.e. "red" state or "blue" state based on
how the state had voted in the majority of the last eight presidential elections). In sum, of
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the seven demographic variables explored, political identity seemed most relevant and
influential to the dependent variables of Fairness, and Social Justice.
First, a one-way analysis of covariance compared participants assigned to the
three conditions to the Fairness and Social Justice scores, controlling for the covariate
effects of political identity. This analysis was found to be statistically non-significant for
the effect of condition on Fairness scores (F(2,289) =.618, p = .59) indicating that the
construal level task was unsuccessful at influencing participants’ support for Fairness
even after controlling for the influence of political identity. However, this analysis was
found to be statistically significant for the effect of the interaction between condition and
political identity (F(2,289) = 6.08, p = .003) indicating a differential relationship between
political identity and Social Justice scores across manipulated conditions (see Table 31
for details). The interaction was probed by testing the conditional effects of condition at
three levels of political identity: one standard deviation below the mean, at the mean, and
one standard above the mean. This analysis was significant only for the abstract condition
compared to the control condition; the concrete condition did not differ from the control
condition. At one standard deviation below the mean of political identity (more
liberal/Democrat), support for social justice was higher in the abstract condition
(Mconditional = 6.13) than the control condition (Mconditional = 5.59). At the mean, there were
no differences between conditions F(2,289) = .26, p = .77). At one standard deviation
above the mean of political identity (more conservative/Republican), support for social
justice was lower in the abstract condition (Mconditional = 3.89) than the control condition
(Mconditional = 4.47).
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To further investigate the specifics of this interaction, hierarchical multiple
regression analysis was used to test if the two manipulation conditions, SSS, political
identity, and their two-way interactions could significantly predict participants'
endorsement of Social Justice. In this model, it was found that SSS did not significantly
predict Social Justice (β = -.14, p = .09), although political identity did (β = -.56, p <
.001), and the interaction between SSS and political identity was a marginally significant
predictor (β = .04, p = .06). In addition, the dummy-coded abstract construal level
condition was a significant predictor of Social Justice scores compared to the control
condition (β = 1.02, p = .005) although the concrete condition was not (β = .35, p = .35).
Lastly, the interaction between the abstract condition and political identity was significant
(β = 2.98, p = .002) but the interaction between the concrete condition and political
identity was not (β = -.07, p = .50). The results of the regression indicated that the model
explained a moderate 33.4% of the variance (R2adjusted =.318, F(7,287) = 20.56, p < .001).
See Table 32 for details and Figure 3 for regression plots.
In a similar analysis, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to test if
SSS, political identity and the interaction between the two could significantly predict
participants' endorsement of Fairness. In this model, it was found that SSS did not
significantly predict Fairness (β = -.14, p = .09), although political identity did (β = -.56,
p < .001), and the interaction between SSS and political identity was a marginally
significant predictor (β = .04, p = .06). The results of the regression indicated that the
model explained a moderate 33.4% of the variance (R2adjusted =.318, F(7,287) = 20.56, p <
.001).
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B. STUDY 4
1. Purpose
In Study 4, individuated or categorical cognitive perspective was manipulated
and the effects were measured on acceptability ratings of scenarios presenting conflict
between social justice and fairness; social class was then measured using the ten-rung
SSS ladder. In this way, Study 4 aimed to test the individuated/categorical cognitive
perspective as a predictor of support for violations of social justice and fairness. Study 4
asked participants to use a concrete/individuated perspective or an abstract/categorical
perspective, and then measured their attitudes using the scenarios from Study 2. The
hypothesized outcome in Study 4 was that compared to the control and
concrete/individuated group, participants primed with an abstract/categorical perspective
would indicate lower acceptability of the Fair but Socially Unjust scenarios, and higher
acceptability of Socially Just but Unfair scenarios.
2. Methods
a. Participants
Participants were again recruited online from a diverse and inclusive population
through Amazon Mechanical Turk in January of 2017, and were screened to ensure they
had not completed the prior studies. Although 302 participants began the study, 21
participants were excluded for incomplete responses, or if the time they took to complete
the study was more than three standard deviations above the mean completion time (M =
6.9. Ultimately, 281 participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions.
Participants provided informed consent and received monetary compensation for their
participation of $0.45, which reflects norms on the MTurk platform.
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Participants ranged in age from 20 to 84 (M = 39 years, SD = 13.2).
Approximately 50.9% of the participants were female. The majority of participants
described themselves as White (79.7%), 5% Black, 5.3% Hispanic/Latino/a, 7.8%
Asian/Pacific Islander, and 2.1% multiethnic.
All participants were located in the U.S. while participating in the study, and
96.4% were born in the U.S. (11 participants were born outside of the US). In terms of
current location, 51% of participants were reporting from states that voted for a
conservative presidential candidate in the majority of the last eight elections (“red”
states); forty-nine percent of participants were located in states that voted for a liberal
presidential candidate in the majority of the last eight elections (“blue” states).
In terms of education, 18.9% of participants reported having a high school degree
or GED, 29.9% associate’s degree or some college, 33.8% bachelor’s degree, 14.6%
master’s degree, and 2.8% reported having completed advanced graduate work.
Participants also reported household income ranges: median reported household income
range was $50,000 - $59,999, similar to the national median ($50,000 - $59,999, Census
2015).
b. Materials
1) Individuated/Categorical Perspective Manipulation
Participants in experimental conditions completed one of the versions of the
Construal Level priming task drawn from Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi (2006)
as in Study 3 [see Appendix H for full task stimuli and directions].
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2) Social Justice and Fairness Scenarios
Study 4 used acceptability ratings (from 1 to 7, 1 = “not at all acceptable” and 7 =
“very acceptable”) of the same hypothetical scenarios from Study 2 as the dependent
variable rather than the scale items. Each of the 10 scenarios pitted fairness and social
justice values against each other such that they showcase instances where input-based
deservingness rules create a skewed distribution across groups (five scenarios, α = .78),
or instances where rules that support group membership-based equality violate individual
deservingness (five scenarios, α = .72). See Appendix D for full list of scenarios.
Analyses utilized these scenarios as two separate sets as their mixed and reverse-coded
reliability was lower (ten scenarios, α = .59).
3) Social Class Measure
Participants saw the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status used in the
previous two studies. A description of the ladder and its ten rungs as representing society
was provided and participants were asked to indicate which of the ten rungs might best
represent their social class position in US society from 1 - “Worst off” to 10 - “Best off.”
4) Measures of Individuated/Categorical Thinking
Participants completed the Behavioral Identification Form (eight items, α = .68)
from the previous studies. The Kimchi-Palmer task was omitted as no previous analyses
suggested it was a relevant measure to the variables studied.
c. Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in (3x1):
concrete/individuated perspective (n = 101), abstract/categorical perspective (n = 62), and
a control condition (n = 118). Participants first completed the cognitive perspective
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manipulation task (the control condition did not complete any task but saw the list of
words). Participants in all three conditions then rated all ten scenarios in random order.
Then, participants completed the eight-item BIF. Lastly, all participants provided
demographic information including the SSS ladder measure, age, race, gender, political
identity, religiosity, income, occupation, and educational attainment level [see Appendix
G for full demographic survey].
3. Results
a. Analytic Plan
First, to examine the effects of the construal level task on the scenario ratings, a
multivariate one-way analysis of variance wasused to compare means across participants
in the three conditions. Second, multiple regression analyses examined the ability of
average scores on the Behavioral Identification Form, along with SSS position, to predict
scenario ratings. Third, post-hoc analyses included demographic variables, especially
political identity, as covariates in an attempt to explore the effect of related (and possibly
confounding) variables.
b. Primary Analyses
Means and standard deviations for positions on the Subjective Social Status (SSS)
ladder and average scores on the Fair but Socially Unjust (FUJ) and Socially Just but
Unfair (JUF) scenarios are presented in Table 34. Overall, participants reported SSS
positions close to the midpoint (M = 4.98, SD = 1.65), and average acceptability ratings
of Fair but Socially Unjust scenarios (M = 3.64, SD = 1.27) was slightly lower than
support of Socially Just but Unfair scenarios (M = 3.73, SD = 1.12). The assumption of
normality was tested using the Shapiro-Wilke statistic, which was significant for both
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Fairness and Social Justice scores (Fairness S-W statistic = .988, df = 281, p = .017;
Social Justice S-W statistic = .988, df = 281, p = .024). However, histograms of the data
don’t suggest major departures from normality, and square root transformations of the
positively skewed data did not restore normality. Furthermore, several dozen responses,
although extreme, could not be considered outliers and, with no statistical or practical
motivation to do otherwise, were not removed from the sample.
First, to test the effectiveness of the construal level manipulation, a multivariate
one-way analysis of variance compared participants assigned to the three conditions
(control = 0, concrete construal level manipulation = 1, and abstract construal level
manipulation = 2) to both sets of scenarios. A MANOVA was used over an ANOVA
because the scenarios were presented together, positively correlated (r(281) = .15, p =
.01), and included elements of both Fairness and Social Justice principles in each
scenario. Additionally, the Box’s M value of 3.80 was associated with a p value of .709,
which suggests that the covariance matrices between the groups can be assumed equal for
the purposes of the MANOVA even though the groups had different sample sizes. The
results of this analysis were found to be statistically significant overall, F(4,556) = 2.41, p
= .048. Specifically, there were no differences between conditions for Fair but Unjust
scenarios (FUJ), F(2,278) = .08, p = .45 but there were differences between conditions for
Socially Just but Unfair scenarios (JUF), F(2,278) = 3.41, p = .034) indicating that the
construal level manipulation task was successful at influencing participants’ acceptability
ratings of Socially Just but Unfair scenarios. This effect was small, however (η2 =.02).
See Table 35 for detailed MANOVA results. A Tukey post hoc test revealed that the
average acceptability of JUF scenarios was statistically significantly lower in the abstract
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construal level condition (M = 3.40) than the concrete construal level condition (M =
3.85, p = .038). There was no statistically significant difference between the abstract and
control conditions (p = .067, marginal) or the concrete and control conditions (p = .94),
see Figure 4 for bar chart. In addition, this effect of the abstract construal level condition
on JUF ratings was not mediated by scores on the BIF, indirect effect omnibus β < .001,
CI [-.008, .002].
Next, a Pearson product-moment correlation explored the relationship between
the ten-rung SSS, which was gathered at the end with demographic information, and
average acceptability ratings of both FUJ and JUF scenarios. This analysis was found to
be statistically significant for SSS and FUJ scenarios, r(281) = .193, p = .001, indicating a
moderate positive relationship. SSS was unrelated to JUF scenarios (r(281) = -.051, p =
.39). See Table 36 for full correlation table.
As a baseline measure, the eight-item BIF was also presented to participants at the
end of the study. This measure was included, rather than the Kimchi-Palmer figures, as
the previous studies suggested that the BIF was most relevant to the variables studied.
Again perhaps because the measure was presented much later after the manipulation
tasks, there were no differences in the BIF across conditions (F(2,278) = .03, p = .97).
Similar to the previous studies, these were used along with SSS position to attempt to
predict ratings of both sets of scenarios. Specifically, the average score of this and the
ten-rung SSS measure were entered into a hierarchical multiple regression with their
interaction entered in the second step. The residuals of both of these regression analyses
appeared normally distributed. It was found that neither SSS, the BIF, nor their
interaction were significant predictors of Socially Just but Unfair scenarios (R2 = .006,
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F(3, 277) = .58, p = .63), see Table 37 for details. However, the regression analysis did
suggest that FUJ ratings can be predicted by SSS position (β = .16, p = .001) and
marginally by the BIF (β = -.48, p = .10) but not by their interaction (β = -.05, p = .81),
see Table 38 for details. The complete model predicted only about 4.7% of the variance
in FUJ ratings (R2adjusted = .036, F(3,277) = 4.51, p = .004).
c. Post-hoc Analyses
To attempt to improve this model, several demographic variables were then
explored in relation to the ladder and both sets of scenarios. FUJ ratings were positively
associated with political identity, r(281) = .46, p < .001. This variable was a composite
measure averaging responses to two items related to the extent to which participants’
identified with the labels “liberal/conservative” and “Democrat/Republican” on a scale
from 1 = “Not at all” to 7 = “Very.” FUJ ratings were also lower for females, F(1,279) =
9.78, p = .002. Conversely, political identity was negatively associated with JUF ratings,
r(281) = -.17, p = .004 (see Table 36 for full correlations table). JUF ratings were also
negatively associated with age, r(281) = -.18, p = .002, and differed across ethnicity,
F(5,275) = 4.06, p = .001. Specifically, a Tukey post hoc test revealed that the average
acceptability of JUF scenarios was statistically significantly higher for Blacks/African
Americans (M = 4.74) than for Whites (M = 3.71, p = .009), Asians (M = 3.49, p = .027),
and Hispanic/Latino/as (M = 3.51, p = .014). Also, as can be expected, relative Social
Class (SSS) was positively associated with income (r(281) = .56, p < .001), conservative
political identity (r(281) = .14, p = .018), and education (F(6,274) = 5.69, p < .001) across
8 increasingly greater education levels. In sum, of the seven demographic variables
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explored, political identity, gender, and ethnicity seemed most relevant and influential to
the dependent variables.
Thus, a multivariate one-way analysis of covariance was used to compare
participants assigned to the three conditions to the two sets of scenarios, controlling for
the covariate effects of the strongest variable, political identity. This analysis was found
to be statistically non-significant for the effect of condition overall (F(4,572) = 1.78, p =
.13) indicating that the construal level task was unsuccessful at influencing participants’
ratings of the scenarios after controlling for the influence of political identity. Effect sizes
(η2) show that political identity has a stronger effect on FUJ ratings than JUF (η2 = .22
versus .03), see Table 39 for details.
To determine if these demographic variables could contribute to predicting ratings
of scenarios, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis tested if SSS, the BIF, gender,
political identity could significantly predict participants' ratings of Fair but Socially
Unjust scenarios. Their two-way interactions were entered in the second step. In the main
effects model, it was found that SSS significantly predicted FUJ ratings (β = .12, p =
.005), as did political identity (β = .32, p < .001), and gender (β = -.46, p = .001), while
the BIF was marginally significant (β = -.51, p = .053). None of the two-way interactions
were significant. The results of the regression indicated that the full model explained a
moderate 26.8% of the variance (R2adjusted =.249, F(7,273) = 14.28, p < .001), see Table
40 for regression table.
In a similar analysis, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to test if
SSS, political identity, and the dummy-coded conditions could predict participants’
ratings of Socially Just but Unfair scenarios. Their two-way interactions were entered in
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the second step, and the regression compared the abstract and control conditions to the
concrete condition, as the MANOVA indicated this as the key difference. In the main
effects model, it was found that SSS did not significantly predict JUF ratings (β = -.01, p
= .73), although political identity did (β = -.10, p = .009). In addition, the dummy-coded
abstract construal level condition was a significant predictor of JUF ratings compared to
the concrete condition (β = -.41, p = .023) although the control condition was not (β = .07, p = .67). None of the two-way interactions were significant predictors. See Table 41
for regression table. The results of the regression analysis indicated that the model
explained only 5.8% of the variance (R2adjusted =.034, F(7,283) = 2.40, p = .022).
4. Discussion of Studies 3 & 4
In Study 3, construal level manipulations were unsuccessful at influencing
participants’ responses on the Fairness scale, even when controlling for the effects of
participant political identity; there was, however, a stronger negative relationship
between Political Identity and Social Justice responses in the abstract construal level
condition compared to the concrete and control conditions. Influencing abstract or
categorical thinking appears to have increased endorsement of Social Justice for liberals
but decreased support for Social Justice for conservatives, judging by the spread of the
residuals. In Study 4, the manipulation was unsuccessful at influencing participants’
average ratings of scenarios where Social Justice was violated, but, contrary to
hypotheses, the abstract condition did reduce ratings of scenarios where Fairness was
violated. Interestingly, this effect was not explained by a change in construal level as
measured by the BIF. It may be that inducing abstract or categorical thinking highlights
the conflict in violating one principal in favor of another overall. However, the effect of
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condition here is very small (η2 =.02) and may be due to the unequal sample sizes, even
though tests showed no difference in variance across conditions.
In Study 3, relative social class, as measured by SSS position, was not a
significant predictor of endorsement of social justice or fairness principles; issues with
the non-normal distribution of the data may have played a role in this finding being
contrary to Study 1’s findings. In Study 4, SSS did significantly predict acceptability of
scenarios where social justice was violated. That is, the lower in social class people
consider themselves, the more disapproving they were of violations of social justice.
Politics was, however, a strong independent predictor of both the scale items and
the scenarios in both studies. Interestingly, conservative political identity was a stronger
positive predictor of the Fair but Socially Unjust scenarios than of the Socially Just but
Unfair scenario ratings. Again, political identity may have less to do with upholding
Social Justice than it does with supporting it when in conflict with Fairness.
In terms of cognition, the Behavior Identification Form measuring high and low
construal level did not predict the scale responses in Study 3, but in Study 4 it did
marginally and negatively predict approval of scenarios where Social Justice was
violated. Essentially, participants who were thinking at a higher, more abstract level were
significantly more likely to object to the violation of social justice.
Lastly, this objection to violations of social justice was predicted by several
variables independently of each other. These included higher level thinking from the BIF,
a more liberal political identity, lower relative social class, and being female. Disapproval
of the violation of Fairness was interestingly predicted only by conservative political
identity and being in the abstract construal level condition.
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Overall, Studies 3 and 4 suggest that abstract versus concrete thinking appears to
play an independent role in the extent to which liberals support social justice principles,
and the extent to which people object to the violation of Fairness principles. Social class
appears to have a unique but small effect on the extent to which people object to
violations of social justice - but not on thinking about fairness, which remains a fairly
universal value.
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CHAPTER 5
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The studies proposed in this dissertation aimed to further explore the relationship
between social class and beliefs about inequality. Studies 1 and 2 manipulated relative
social class and examined its effects on support for group-based equality (social justice)
and input-based deservingness (fairness), and also measured individuated versus
categorical thinking. Studies 3 and 4 manipulated this thinking, tested its effects on
support for Social Justice and Fairness, and measured social class. This avenue of
research attempted to demonstrate through measurement and manipulation that an
individuated or categorical cognitive perspective is one way of understanding the
complex relationship between social class and beliefs about social justice.
In general, results suggested that though the experimental portion of the research, the
SSS manipulation, was not successful, social class as measured by the SSS ladder
appeared to have a significant effect on support for social justice, but not for fairness. The
lower participants saw themselves on the ladder of resources and position in society, the
greater their support for group-based equality. This effect was largely independent of
political identity, and was particularly demonstrated when participants objected to the
violation of social justice in order to uphold fairness principles in real-world scenarios
that brought the two values into conflict. This situation was also the foundation for the
strongest effects of abstract thinking – higher scores on the BIF decreased approval only
for scenarios involving the violation of social justice in favor of fairness.
The ladder manipulation task has been used successfully in similar research and
manipulation checks in those studies showed significant differences in SSS position
between participants asked to compare themselves to those at the top versus bottom of the
88

ladder (e.g. Kraus, et al., 2013; Piff, et al., 2010). In Studies 1 and 2, however, the
manipulation was unsuccessful at influencing SSS positions even though the exact same
manipulation, image, and instructions were utilized, identical to the above mentioned
studies. Reasons for this could include the limitations of these samples (although the
above mentioned research also accessed online MTurk samples), some other flaw in the
studies’ design, or perhaps simply the “file drawer” problem wherein only manipulations
that were successful have been published. It may also be that the manipulation is not
necessarily effective in general: writing a few sentences about hypothetical interactions
with people at the top or bottom of the SSS ladder is not a sufficiently influential activity
to replace participants’ prior perceptions of their social class relative to larger society.
SSS position was, however, positively correlated with education level and income. Job
type, though, was far more unreliable and was not associated with SSS. This is consistent
with other research where the sheer variety inherent in job content, function, and
qualifications leads to either too much complexity or oversimplification in coding, and
does not allow for accurate association with social class or the creation of a composite
measure (Seagert, et al., 2007).
The two types of dependent variables (scale items and scenario ratings) measuring
support for fairness and social justice also provided insight in different ways across the
studies. In Studies 1 and 3, where the scale items were used, relative social class was not
correlated with fairness, but it was negatively correlated with social justice. In Study 1,
social class was also an independent negative predictor of social justice, but not of
fairness. The effect sizes are in fact comparable to results in similar studies utilizing the
MacArthur SSS and measuring related concepts. This was not replicated in Study 3, but
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the data in this study appear to be more complex and more difficult to interpret due to
normality issues overall. Another explanation may be that the image of the ladder was
included with all items to strengthen the SSS manipulation but this was not true of the
items in Study 3 and no image was used to strengthen the construal level manipulation.
Interestingly, support for fairness was greater than support for social justice when the
scale items were presented, but the converse was true for the scenarios: approval of
Socially Just but Unfair scenarios was slightly higher than approval of Fair but Socially
Unjust scenarios. One interpretation of this reverse pattern is that the scale items are
influenced by social desirability and reflect more automatic or shallow politicized
attitudes, while the scenarios are able to reveal a more complex and enduring belief in
social justice by bringing it into conflict with fairness and highlighting its relative
importance. For the scale items, support for social justice and fairness were not
negatively correlated in either the present studies or previous research, demonstrating that
many people can endorse both values simultaneously – especially fairness, which has
high approval across demographic variables. When it came to the scenarios, participants
were forced to make a choice between them and the impact of this conflict calls for
further investigation; it remains of interest to understand the characteristics of those who
continue to support social justice even when fairness is violated. Similar to a 2015
neuropsychological study that found that higher SES individuals perceived themselves to
be more empathic but, in fact, showed less response to others’ pain (Varnum, Blaise,
Hampton & Brewer, 2015), the pattern found here warrants further exploration as to
whether the scale items or conflict-based scenarios are reflecting beliefs more predictive
of behavior. Moreover, these differential responses to the two principles across scales
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and scenarios provide further evidence for distinguishing social justice and fairness as
distinct moral values as reflected in the Model of Moral Motives, but not in Moral
Foundations Theory.
Approval of the Socially Just but Unfair scenarios over both Studies 2 and 4 were still
best predicted by political identity. In Study 2, they were also negatively correlated with
relative social class. This was not replicated in Study 4, but there also seemed to be
contradictory results here where participants in the abstract condition reported less
approval of these scenarios where social justice was upheld.
Fortunately, results related to the Fair but Socially Unjust scenarios were more
consistent across Studies 2 and 4. In both studies, SSS and approval of these scenarios
where social justice was violated were positively correlated to the same magnitude. In
addition, increased approval of these scenarios was similarly predicted by higher social
class, more conservative political identity, and lower construal level across both studies.
In post-hoc analyses, political identity emerged as an important demographic
predictor. More liberal participants were predictably more supportive of social justice,
but mediation analyses also showed that this effect did not entirely explain the effect of
social class on social justice beliefs. That is, social class appears to have had a unique
role in influencing approval or disapproval of real-world scenarios where social justice is
violated. And, although conservative political identity was differentially associated with
the scale items, it was far less influential on the ratings of the scenarios as measured by
decreased effect sizes. Moreover, there was greater variability among liberals than among
conservatives: while conservatives were predictably and uniformly less supportive of
social justice, liberals did not all consistently endorse social justice, suggesting that there
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is more to understanding who supports social justice than merely political identity. Last,
as in previous studies, the effect of political identity and social class was not as strong for
support of fairness, which appears to be less malleable and more universal.
The scenarios where social justice was violated (FUJ) were also where cognition
came into play. Specifically, higher scores on the BIF but not the Kimchi-Palmer figures
were predictive of decreased approval of these scenarios in both Studies 2 and 4. As
mentioned earlier, the two measures are intended to capture related but slightly
qualitatively different concepts and it appears that construal level is the more relevant
concept over local/global thinking across all four studies. The effect represented by the
BIF supports the hypothesis that abstract thinking may increase support for social justice
– or, in this case, increase objections to the violation of social justice as in the FUJ
scenarios. The present research then brings up several other questions about the
relationship between abstract/categorical thinking and social justice. These include the
nature of this style of thinking: is it a long-term individual difference or an effect of
context and situation? How enduring or flexible is this style of thinking? Future research
is warranted.
In the regression analyses, measured construal level did not interact with any of the
other predictive variables – particularly not with political identity. In Study 3, however,
participants in the abstract construal level condition responded differently to the social
justice scale items depending on their political identity: more liberal participants reported
increased support of social justice while more conservative participants reported
decreased support of social justice. Analyses suggested that this effect strongest for
liberals where perhaps thinking abstractly helped strengthen beliefs they already held.
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These differential results for measured versus manipulated construal level also suggest
that the relationship between the construal level task and the BIF is not clear, i.e. are they
accessing the same underlying concept? The present research could thus be expanded by
the use of different measures and/or manipulations related to construal level that may be
more sensitive to the specific cognitive processes surrounding thinking about social
justice and fairness. In addition, the interaction of politics and condition is significant in
Study 3 with scale items, but not in Study 4 with scenarios. Unlike Studies 1 and 2 where
an image of the ladder was included with each dependent measure item to strengthen the
manipulation, no such cue was included with these items. Therefore, it may be that the
effect of the abstract/concrete construal level task faded with the cognitive effort required
in processing the complex scenarios.
Last, gender was an independent and significant effect on Fair but Unjust scenarios in
both Studies 2 and 4 wherein females were less approving of scenarios where social
justice was violated. This effect was not driven by difference in political identity or other
demographic variables between the genders. One explanation for this is the notion that
women are more sensitive to violations of social justice because they are arguably lower
in status in a general sense, although not statistically on the SSS in these studies.
Functionally, this moderate and consistent effect suggests that future research should
more closely examine the role of two other concepts that are also affected by gender:
empathy and interdependence (Varnum, et al., 2015). These may shed more light on both
the effect of gender and the basis of support for social justice.
Of course, the four studies presented here are limited in their scope in several ways.
One of these is the fact that there were unequal sample sizes between the control groups
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and experimental conditions, especially in Studies 3 and 4. This was a result of the study
design: participants were randomly and evenly assigned to a condition immediately after
providing consent, but more of the participants assigned to the experimental conditions
requiring the arduous task of writing in response to a prompt ended their session with
incomplete data, i.e., not having completed the manipulation task (these participants were
included in the number of dropped participants in the results). Although tests, residuals,
and histograms showed homogeneity of variance across the groups, there may be
cognitive differences between people who continued with the study and those who
terminated their session upon seeing the longer assignment.
Second, the sample comes from an online pool of survey takers who tend to be
slightly more liberal in political identity and lower in social class. Analyses on the states
in which they resided showed that there were equal numbers of participants from “red”
and “blue” states, but there were very few participants who indicated they belonged at the
9- or 10-rung mark on the SSS (on average, 3 participants in each study) compared to the
1- or 2-run mark (on average, 125 participants in each study and only about two
participants at rung 1 in each study). A future step may be accessing a different sample
with greater variance across the SSS ladder, especially towards the high end.
Moreover, the majority of participants and, indeed, people, tend to consider
themselves “middle class” and, thus, place themselves between 4 and 6 on the SSS. For
most people, social class remains a relative concept, highly linked to social comparison
and reference groups. Even as globalization in the present may be increasing exposure to
the ultra-rich and/or desperately poor, this may not necessarily affect the self-concept.
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Thus, stronger manipulations using greater perspective-taking and manipulation of the
reference group may deliver more consistent effects.
Simultaneously, other programs of research suggest that social class is more than just
rank and that the sociopolitical context of class should be an important consideration
(Stephens & Townsend, 2013). One application of this to the present work is that the
culture of social class is more unique in and relevant to the top and bottom of the SSS
ladder, but not so much in the middle. Such a perspective would make accessing a wider
range of people from different class backgrounds even more imperative.
Ultimately, just as previous research has suggested that increases in social class are
associated with decreases in empathy, ethical behavior, and interdependence, and
increases in essentialism, deservingness, and hierarchy, the present research would add
decreased support for social justice to this list. This is particularly concerning in that U.S.
society at least is moving towards greater inequality and this research suggests that the
gap in income and resources will continue to translate into a gap in attitudes and beliefs
about society as a whole. More understanding of the effects of social class on social
justice can serve as a step towards understanding the maintenance of economic
inequality, particularly by the high social class who tend to be in power. In a practical
sense, these studies and other research that aligns with it advocate for that power to be
systematically distributed more evenly with such efforts as more political representation
by low-SES groups and opposition to voter-suppression efforts. In addition, low-SES and
race are highly linked in the U.S. and although these studies did not have enough
statistical power to test effects of and interactions with race and ethnicity, this could be an
interesting extension of the research.
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The present research also suggests that there is far more complexity in the answer to
the question of who supports social justice principles in the face of conflict – social class,
political identity, and other demographic variables may play a small role but they are by
no means the sum of the explanation. Considering that abstract thinking played a
particular role in determining support for social justice when in conflict with fairness, it
may be that this question is partly answered by the extent to which one broadly defines a
community or a larger society to include people unlike themselves. The relationship
between abstract thinking and scenarios in which social justice is violated to uphold
fairness is a particularly interesting avenue of future research. More involved scenarios or
a different measure/manipulation of abstract thinking may be able to better demonstrate
the underlying effect. Other minor results also suggest that the model presented here is
incomplete; empathy or interdependence may serve greater functions than the literature
suggests and these deserve exploration.
Furthermore, if social justice is a form of principlism, a reliable and rational
motivation to uphold a moral principle, then understanding the antecedents of social
justice and fairness, beyond the constraints of social class and self-interest, is critical to
alleviating the large-scale and pernicious effects of socioeconomic inequality. In general,
the results of these studies suggest that social class and abstract thinking play significant
and independent roles in determining who supports social justice in the face of conflict.
Moving forward, exploring the ways in which social class and abstract thinking affect our
perceptions of the people and communities around us would allow us to gain a better
understanding of moral attitudes towards socioeconomic inequality.
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Table 36: Study 4 Correlations

111

Table 37: Study 4 Multiple Regression on JUF

Table 38: Study 4 Multiple Regression on FUJ

112
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Figure 1: Study 1 Partial Mediation of Social Class and Social Justice by Politics (34%)
Political Identity
-.35*

.16*

Relative Social Class

Social Justice Beliefs
-.16* ( -.11*)

Figure 2: Study 2 Partial Mediation of Social Class and FUJ scenarios by Politics (28%)
Political Identity
.32*

.13*

Fair but Unjust Scenarios

Relative Social Class
.15* (.11*)
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Figure 3: Study 3 Politics by Condition interaction on Social Justice (Condition 2 =
Abstract)
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Figure 4: Study 4 Effect of Condition on Scenarios
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
FAIRNESS SCALE
(Revised Preference for Merit Principle Scale)
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each o the following
statements by circling the appropriate number on the scale below. Items are to be rated
on a seven-point scale with the following anchors: (1) strongly disagree (2) moderately
disagree (3) slightly disagree (4) neither agree nor disagree (5) slightly agree (6)
moderately agree and (7) strongly agree.
1. In society, people who do a good job ought to rise to the top.
2. The effort a person puts into something ought to be reflected in the size of the reward
he or she receives.
3. Members of a team ought to receive different rewards depending on the amount each
person contributed.
4. Between two equally smart people, the one who is the harder worker ought to always
be rewarded more.
5. If every person in a group has the same abilities, rewards ought to be given to the
person who puts in the most effort.
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APPENDIX B
SOCIAL JUSTICE SCALE
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each o the following
statements by circling the appropriate number on the scale below. Items are to be rated
on a seven-point scale with the following anchors: (1) strongly disagree (2) moderately
disagree (3) slightly disagree (4) neither agree nor disagree (5) slightly agree (6)
moderately agree and (7) strongly agree.
1. It is our responsibility, not just a matter of personal preference, to provide for
groups worse off in society.
2. It is important for those who are better off to help provide resources for the most
vulnerable members of society.
3. In the healthiest societies, those at the top should feel responsible for improving
the well-being of those at the bottom.
4. Increased economic equality is ultimately beneficial to everyone in society.
5. Helping those at the bottom of society will not discourage them from working
harder.
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APPENDIX C
MACARTHUR SCALE OF SUBJECTIVE SES
(Adler, Epel, Castellazzo & Ickovics, 2000)

Manipulation (Piff, et al., 2010)
“Now, please compare yourself to the people at the very bottom [top] of the
ladder. These are people who are the worst [best] off—those who have the least
[most] money, least [most] education, and the least [most] respected jobs. In
particular, we’d like you to think about how you are different from these people in
terms of your own income, educational history, and job status. Where would you
place yourself on this ladder relative to these people at the very bottom [top]?
o To strengthen the manipulation, participants are instructed to write about a
hypothetical interaction with a person from the bottom or top of the
ladder. Participants then indicate their own standing on the ladder; the
bottom rung is coded as “1,” and the top rung is coded as “10.”
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APPENDIX D
SCENARIOS
Fairness Scenarios
1. In a city neighborhood, parents donate a great deal of money to their children’s
public school. Other public schools in the city with lower income families get no
additional funds from parents.
2. Students at a respected college are admitted solely on the basis of their academic
merit - a combination of students’ grade point average and their SAT scores.
Students who were not afforded the opportunity to have a high-quality education
are unlikely to be admitted.
3. A popular company provides experience to students through valuable, unpaid
summer internships. Students who must earn money over the summer are not at
liberty to accept unpaid internships.
4. A public school encourages students to join others in field learning outside of the
classroom for a small travel fee. Students from low-income families are not able
to pay the fee and, thus, are left behind.
5. A university offers admission into an exclusive honors program, with smaller
classes and greater networking opportunities, which results in increased tuition
levels. Students from low-income families are not able to take advantage of these
opportunities, regardless of how qualified they may be.
Social Justice Scenarios
1. A very successful state-funded program has been established for special needs
children who are also from underserved communities. Some parents with special
needs children want to send their children to the successful program, but cannot
because they are not from an under-served community.
2. Top colleges are engaging in major recruitment efforts at low income high
schools to increase interest and applications from these students. Students at
private high schools are now receiving less attention from top colleges.
3. Students at a major university are admitted based on a combination of factors,
including, in particular, past hardship, and group membership. Some students with
better academic records are not admitted to the university.
4. In a new urban housing development, rent does not increase for its low-income
tenants when the market for real estate changes. The rest of the city’s tenants must
pay increased rent as market prices for real estate increase.
5. A highly valued job training program is offered to people from typically
underserved areas of the city. People who may benefit from the program, but do
not reside in those underserved areas, are not able to participate.
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APPENDIX E
KIMCHI-PALMER FIGURES
(Kimchi & Palmer, 1982) Stimuli (1-8) will be randomized in presentation

Shape 2

Shape 3

Shape 4

Shape 5

Shape 6
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Shape 7

Shape 8

APPENDIX F
BEHAVIOR IDENTIFICATION FORM
(Vallacher & Wegner, 1989)
Any behavior can be described in many ways. For example, one person might describe a
behavior as "writing a paper," while another person might describe the same behavior as
"pushing keys on the keyboard." Yet another person might describe it as "expressing
thoughts." This form focuses on your personal preferences for how a number of different
behaviors should be described. Below you will find several behaviors listed. After each
behavior will be two different ways in which the behavior might be identified.
For example:
1. Attending class
o sitting in a chair
o looking at a teacher
Your task is to choose the identification, a or b, that best describes the behavior for you.
Simply place a checkmark next to the option you prefer. Be sure to respond to every item.
Please mark only one alternative for each pair. Remember, mark the description that you
personally believe is more appropriate for each pair.
Sweeping the floor
- Moving a broom
- Being clean*
Attending a family reunion
- Going to a picnic
- Respecting tradition*
Skydiving
- Jumping out of airplane
- Demonstrating one’s daringness*
Making an expensive purchase
- Swiping a credit card
- Doing something for one’s pleasure*
Staying home to study
- Reviewing one’s notes
- Exerting self-discipline*
Recycling
- Bagging paper, glass, and cans
- Caring for the environment*
Teaching
- Talking to students
- Having authority*
Meeting new people
- Small talk and shaking hands
- Enhancing one’s social network*
* Higher level alternative is the second option, but should be randomized in presentation
Total score is the sum of higher level alternative choices.
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APPENDIX G
DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY
Religion
1. To what extent do you consider yourself a religious person?
(Scale from 1 to 7; 1 = not at all religious, 7 = very religious)
2. How important a role does religion play in your life?
(Scale from 1 to 7; 1 = not at all important, 7 = very important)

Politics
1. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
(Scale from 1 to 7; 1 = strong democrat, 7 = strong republican)
2. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
(Scale from 1 to 7; 1 = very liberal, 7 = very conservative)
Ethnicity
White – Black – Hispanic/Latino/a – Asian/Pacific Islander –
American Indian/Alaskan Native – Multiethnic – Other
Age
Open-ended response
Gender
Male – Female – Prefer not to disclose
Educational Attainment
Please check the category that describes the level of education you have achieved.
Credentials: 0 = did not complete high school, 1 = GED, 2 = high school diploma, 3 =
postsecondary vocational certificate, 4 = associate’s degree, 5 = bachelor’s degree, 6 =
master’s degree, 7 = doctoral degree (Ph.D., JD., M.D.).
Income
Please check the category that tells us your approximate total family income for one
typical calendar year. Consider all sources of income, including earnings, welfare cash
assistance, child support alimonies, support from other members of your household who
regularly contribute to your household, etc.
______ Less than $10,000
______ $10,001 to $15,000 ______ $15,001 to $25,000
______ $25,001 to $50,000 ______$50,001 to $75,000 ______$75,001 to $100,000
______$100,001 to $150,000 ______$150,001 to $300,000
______$300,001 to $750,000 ______ more than $750,000.
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Occupational Prestige
Currently, what is your main occupation or job title? Please be specific and include your
industry. If you are currently unemployed, please indicate as such, and then include your
previous occupation.
Open-ended response. Responses will be coded based on the following codes in the
Hollingshead Four-Factor Index of Socioeconomic Status (Hollingshead, 1975).
9=higher executive, proprietor of large businesses, major professional
8=administrators, lesser professionals, proprietor of medium-sized business
7=smaller business owners, farm owners, managers, minor professionals
6=technicians, semi-professionals, small business owners (business valued at $50,00070,000),
5=clerical and sales workers, small farm and business owners (business valued at
$25,000-50,000),
4=smaller business owners (<$25,000), skilled manual laborers, craftsmen, tenant
farmers,
3=machine operators and semi-skilled workers,
2=unskilled workers,
1=farm laborers, menial service workers, students, housewives, (dependent on welfare,
no regular occupation),
0=not applicable or unknown.
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APPENDIX H
CONSTRUAL LEVEL TASK
(Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006)
Abstract Directions:
Please read the following list of 20 words. Using the blank next to each word, please type
an answer to the following question.
__________ is an example of what?
Concrete Directions:
Please read the following list of 20 words. Using the blank next to each word, please type
an answer to the following question.
An example of __________ is what?
Neutral Directions:
Please read the following list of 20 words.
List of 20 words:
Singer
King
Pasta
Car
Soap
Dog
Book
Family
Soda
Shoes
Lamp
Tree
Sandwich
Doctor
Shark
Hat
Screwdriver
Paint
City
Bag

126

REFERENCES
Adler, N., Epel, E., Castellazzo, G., & Ickovics, J. (2000). Relationship of subjective and
objective social status with psychological and physiological functioning:
Preliminary data in healthy, White women. Health Psychology, 19(6), 586-592.

Anderson, C., & Kilduff, G. J. (2009). The pursuit of status in social groups. Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 18, 295–298.

Batson, C. D. (1991). The altruism question: Toward a social-psychological answer.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Batson, C. & Ahmad, N. (2002). Four motives for community involvement. Journal of
Social Issues, 58(3), 429-445.

Batson, C., Ahmad, N., Yin, J., Bedell, S., Johnson, J., & Templin, C. (1999). Two
Threats to the Common Good: self-interested egoism and empathy-induced
altruism. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(1), 3-16.

Batson, C., Kennedy, C., Nord, L., Stocks, E., Fleming, D., & Marzette, C. (2007). Anger
at unfairness: is it moral outrage? European Journal of Social Psychology, 37(6),
1272-1285.

Batson, D., Duncan, B., Ackerman, P., Buckley, T., & Birch, K. (1981). Is empathic
emotion a source of altruistic motivation? Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 40(2), 290-302.

Bernardo, A. B. I. (2013). Social dominance orientation and attitudes towards the poor:
Contrasting lower and higher socioeconomic groups in the Philippines. Philippine
Journal of Psychology, 46, 39-69.

Bettencourt, B., Charlton, K., Dorr, N., & Hume, D. (2001). Status differences and ingroup bias: A meta-analytic examination of the effects of status stability, status
legitimacy, and group permeability. Psychological Bulletin, 127(4), 520-542.

Bharadwaj, P. & Janoff-Bulman, R. (under review). Fairness and Social Justice: Distinct
moralities.
127

Blader, S., & Chen, Y. (2012). Differentiating the effects of status and power: A justice
perspective. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102(5), 994-1014.

Blader, S. L., & Chen, Y. (2011). What influences how higher status people respond to
lower status others? Effects of procedural fairness, outcome favorability, and
concerns about status. Organization Science, 22, 1040– 1060.

Brandt, M. (2013). Do the disadvantaged legitimize the social system? A large-scale test
of the status–legitimacy hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 104(5), 765-785.

Brandt, M., Wetherell, G., & Henry, P. (2014). Changes in income predict change in
social trust: A longitudinal analysis. Political Psychology, 36(6), 761-768.

Brockner, J., Chen, Y., Mannix, E. A., Leung, K., & Skarlicki, D. P. (2000). Culture and
procedural fairness: When the effects of what you do depend on how you do it.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 45, 138– 159.

Brockner, J., De Cremer, D., van den Bos, K., & Chen, Y. (2005). The influence of
interdependent self-construal on procedural fairness effects. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 96(2), 155-167.

Callan, M., Sutton, R., & Dovale, C. (2010). When deserving translates into causing: The
effect of cognitive load on immanent justice reasoning. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 46(6), 1097-1100.

Causa, O. and Johansson, A. (2011). "Intergenerational social mobility in OECD
countries". Economic Studies, 1.

Chen, Y., Peterson, R., Phillips, D., Podolny, J., & Ridgeway, C. (2011). Bringing
“status” to the table: Attaining, maintaining, and experiencing status in
organizations and markets. Organization Science, 23(2), 299-307.

Chance, M. R. A., & Jolly, C. J. (1970). Social groups of monkeys, apes, and men. New
York: Dutton.
128

Cohen, R. L. (1987). Distributive justice: Theory and research. Social Justice Research,
1, 19-40.

Decety, J. & Yoder, K.Y. (2016). Empathy and motivation for justice: Cognitive empathy
and concern, but not emotional empathy, predict sensitivity to injustice for others.
Social Neuroscience, 11(1), 1-14.

Derryberry, D. & Reed, M. (1998). Anxiety and attentional focusing: trait, state and
hemispheric influences. Personality and Individual Differences, 25(4), 745-761.

DeScioli, P., Massenkoff, M., Shaw, A., Petersen, M. B., & Kurzban, R. (2014). Equity
or equality? Moral judgments follow the money. Proceedings of the Royal Society
B: Biological Sciences, 281(1797), 2014-2112.

Diemer, M. A., Mistry, R. S., Wadsworth, M. E., López, I. and Reimers, F. (2013). Best
Practices in Conceptualizing and Measuring Social Class in Psychological
Research. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 13, 77–113.

Dugan, A. (2012, November 30). Americans most likely to say they belong to the middle
class. Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com.

Eisenberg, N., & Morris, A. S. (2001). The origins and social significance of empathyrelated responding: A review of empathy and moral development: Implications
for caring and justice by M. L. Hoffman. Social Justice Research, 14(1), 95-120.

Eyal, T., Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (2008). Judging near and distant virtue and vice.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 44, 1204–1209.

Fiske, S. (2010). Interpersonal Stratification: Status, power, and subordination. Handbook
of Social Psychology.

Fiske, Susan T.; Cuddy, Amy J. C.; Glick, Peter; Xu, Jun (2002). "A Model of (Often
Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from
perceived status and competition" (PDF). Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 82 (6): 878–902.

129

Gallo, L. C. (2009), The Reserve Capacity Model as a framework for understanding
psychosocial factors in health disparities. Applied Psychology: Health and WellBeing, 1, 62–72.

Gallo, L. C., Bogart, L. M., Vranceanu, A., Matthews, K. A. (2005). Socioeconomic
Status, Resources, Psychological Experiences, and Emotional Responses: A test
of the Reserve Capacity Model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
88(2), 386-399.

Gallo, L.C. & Matthews, K.A. (2003). Understanding the association between
socioeconomic status and physical health: do negative emotions play a role?
Psychological Bulletin 129(1), 10-51.

Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2004). Intuitive ethics: How innately prepared intuitions
generate culturally variable virtues. Daedalus, Fall, 55-66.

Henry, P. J., & Saul, A. (2006). The Development of System Justification in the
developing world. Social Justice Research, 19(3), 365-378.

Hegtvedt, K., & Thompson, E. (1988). Attributions for fair exchange outcomes: The
effects of power and status. Social Justice Research, 2(2), 113-135.

Hitokoto, H. (2014). Interdependent Happiness: Cultural happiness under the East Asian
cultural mandate. JICA-RI, 79.

Hoffman, M. (1990). Empathy and justice motivation. Motivation & Emotion, 14(2),
151-172.

Hoffman, M.L. (2000). Empathy and Moral Development. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

Hollingshead, A. A. (1975). Four-factor index of social status. Unpublished manuscript,
Yale University, New Haven, CT.

Huberman, B. A., Loch, C. H., & Onculer, A. (2004). Status as a valued resource. Social
Psychology Quarterly, 67, 103–114.
130

Janoff-Bulman, R., & Carnes, N. C. (2013). Surveying the moral landscape: Moral
motives and group-based moralities. Personality and Social Psychology Review,
17, 219-236.

Janoff-Bulman, R., Sheikh, S., & Hepp, S. (2009). Proscriptive versus prescriptive
morality: Two faces of moral regulation. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 96, 521-537.

Jost, J., Banaji, M., & Nosek, B. (2004). A Decade of System Justification Theory:
Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo.
Political Psychology, 25(6), 881-919.
Jost, J. T., & Burgess, D. (2000). Attitudinal ambivalence and the conﬂict between group
and system justiﬁcation motives in low status groups. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 26, 293–305.
Jost, J. T., & Hunyady, O. (2002). The psychology of system justiﬁcation and the
palliative function of ideology. European Review of Social Psychology, 13, 111–
153.

Jost, J.T., Hunyady, O. (2005). Antecedents and consequences of System-Justifying
ideologies. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14(5), 260-265.

Jost, J., Pelham, B., & Carvallo, M. (2002). Non-conscious forms of system justification:
Implicit and behavioral preferences for higher status groups. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 38(6), 586-602.

Jost, J. T., Pelham, B. W., Sheldon, O., & Sullivan, B. N. (2003). Social inequality and
the reduction of ideological dissonance on behalf of the system: Evidence of
enhanced system justiﬁcation among the disadvantaged. European Journal of
Social Psychology, 33, 13–36.

Jost, J. T., & Thompson, E. P. (2000). Group-based dominance and opposition to equality
as independent predictors of self-esteem, ethnocentrism, and social policy
attitudes among African Americans and European Americans. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 36, 209–232.

131

Kay, A., & Jost, J. (2003). Complementary Justice: Effects of "Poor but Happy" and
"Poor but Honest" stereotype exemplars on System Justification and implicit
activation of the justice motive. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 85(5), 823-837.

Kazakova, S., Cauberghe, V., Pandelaere, M., & De Pelsmacker, P. (2015). Can't See the
Forest for the Trees? The Effect of Media Multitasking on Cognitive Processing
Style. Media Psychology, 18(4), 425-450.

Knight, N. & Nisbett, R. (2007). Culture, class and cognition: Evidence from Italy.
Journal of Cognition and Culture, 7, 283-291.
Kraus, M.W. (2014). New Left Project: The Psychology of Economic Inequality.
Newleftproject.org. Retrieved 18 March 2016, from
http://www.newleftproject.org/index.php/site/article_comments/the_psychology_
of_economic_inequality

Kraus, M.W., & Callaghan, B. (2014). Noblesse Oblige? Social status and economic
inequality maintenance among politicians. Plos ONE, 9(1), e85293.

Kraus, M.W., & Keltner, D. (2013). Social class rank, essentialism, and punitive
judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 105(2), 247-261.

Kraus, M. W., Piff, P. K., & Keltner, D. (2009). Social class, sense of control, and social
explanation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 992–1004.

Kraus, M.W., Piff, P.K., & Keltner, D. (2011). Social Class as culture: The convergence
of resources and rank in the social realm. Current Directions in Psychological
Science, 20(4), 246-250.

Kraus, M.W., Piff, P.K., Mendoza-Denton, R., Rheinschmidt, M.L., & Keltner, D.
(2012). Social class, solipsism, and contextualism: How the rich are different
from the poor. Psychological Review 119(3), 546-572.

Kraus, M.W. & Tan, J.J.X. (2015). Americans overestimate class mobility. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 58, 101-111.

132

Ledgerwood A., Mandisodza, A.N., Jos, J.T., & Pohl, M.J. (2011). Working for the
system: Motivated defense of meritocratic beliefs. Social Cognition, 29(2), 322–
340.

Li, X., Yang, S., & Li M. (2013). The effects of authoritarian personality and power on
moral thinking. Acta Psychologica Sinica, 44(7), 964-971.

Luhtanen, R., & Crocker, J. (1992). A collective self-esteem scale: Self-evaluation of
one's social identity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 302-318.

Magee, J. C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Social hierarchy: The self-reinforcing nature of
power and status. The Academy of Management Annals, 2, 351–398.

Mahalingam, R. (2003). Essentialism, culture, and power: Representations of social class.
Journal of Social Issues, 59(4), 733-749.

Major, B. 1994. From social inequality to personal entitlement: The role of social
comparisons, legitimacy appraisals, and group membership. Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology, 26, 293–355.

Mani, A., Mullainathan, S., Shafir, E., & Zhao, J. (2013). Poverty impedes cognitive
function. Science, 341(6149), 976-980.

Matthews, K. A., Räikkönen, K., Everson, S. A., Flory, J. D., Marco, C. A., Owens, J. F.,
& Lloyd, C. E. (2000). Do the daily experiences of healthy men and women vary
according to occupational prestige and work strain? Psychosomatic Medicine, 62,
346-353.

Markus, H.R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition,
emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98(2), 224-253.
McCrea, S., Wieber, F., & Myers, A. (2012). Construal level mind-sets moderate selfand social stereotyping. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102(1), 5168.

133

Mentovich, A., Yudkin, D., Tyler, T., & Trope, Y. (2016). Justice Without Borders: The
Influence of Psychological Distance and Construal Level on Moral Exclusion.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 42(10), 1349-1363.

Montada, L., & Schneider, A. (1989). Justice and emotional reactions to the
disadvantaged. Social Justice Research, 3(4), 313-344.

Newport, F. (2015, May 4). Americans continue to say U.S. wealth distribution is unfair.
Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com.

Norton, M., & Ariely, D. (2011). Building a better America--One wealth quintile at a
time. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(1), 9-12.

O'Mara, E., Jackson, L., Batson, C., & Gaertner, L. (2011). Will moral outrage stand up?:
Distinguishing among emotional reactions to a moral violation. European Journal
of Social Psychology, 41(2), 173-179.

Overbeck, J. R., & Park, B. (2001). When power does not corrupt: Superior individuation
processes among powerful perceivers. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 81, 549–565.

Piff, P. (2013). Wealth and the inflated self: Class, entitlement, and
narcissism. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40(1), 34-43.

Piff, P. K., Kraus, M. W., Cote, S., Cheng, B. H., & Keltner, D. (2010). Having less,
giving more: The influence of social class on prosocial behavior. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 771–784.

Piff, P. K., Stancato, D. M., Cote, S., Mendoza-Denton, R., & Keltner, D. (2012). Higher
social class predicts increased unethical behavior. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 109, 4086–4091.

Pitesa, M. & Thau, S. (2014). A lack of material resources causes harsher moral
judgments. Psychological Science, 25(3), 702-710.

134

Pratto, F., Liu, J., Levin, S., Sidanius, J., Shih, M., Bachrach, H., & Hegarty, P. (2000).
Social dominance orientation and the legitimization of inequality across
cultures. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 31(3), 369-409.

Pratto, F., & Stewart, A. (2012). Group dominance and the half-blindness of privilege.
Journal of Social Issues, 68(1), 28-45.

Reay, D. (2005) 'Beyond Consciousness?: The psychic landscape of social
class' Sociology Special Issue of Class, Culture and Identity, 39(5) 911-928.

Ridgeway, C.L. (2001). "Gender, status, and leadership". Journal of Social
Issues, 57,637–655.

Ridgeway, C. L., & Erickson, K. G. (2000). Creating and spreading status beliefs.
American Journal of Sociology, 106, 579–615.

Saegert, S.C., Adler, N.E., Bullock, H.E., Cauce, A., Liu, W.M., Wyche, K.F. (2007)
Report of the APA Task Force on Socioeconomic Status. Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association.

Sampson, E.E. (1975). On justice as equality. Journal of Social Issues, 31(3). 45-64.
Sanders, M., & Mahalingam, R. (2012). Under the radar: The role of invisible discourse
in understanding class-based privilege. Journal of Social Issues, 68(1), 112-127.

Segal, E. A. (2011). Social empathy: A model built on empathy, contextual
understanding, and social responsibility that promotes social justice. Journal of
Social Service Research, 37(3), 266-277.

Shonkoff, J., Boyce, W.T. & McEwen, B.S. (2009). Neuroscience, molecular biology,
and the childhood roots of health disparities. Journal of the American Medical
Association, 301, 2252-2259.

Singelis, T. M. (1994). The Measurement of Independent and Interdependent SelfConstruals. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20(5), 580–591.

135

Skitka, L. & Tetlock, P. (1992). Allocating scarce resources: a contingency model of
distributive justice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 28(6), 491-522.

Skitka, L. J., & Tetlock, P. E. (1993). Of ants and grasshoppers: The political psychology
of allocating public assistance. In B. A. Mellers, J. Baron, B. A. Mellers, J. Baron
(Eds.), Psychological perspectives on justice: Theory and applications (pp. 205233). New York, NY, US: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, J. R., Brooks-Gun, J., & Klebanov, P. (1997). The consequences of living in
poverty for young children's cognitive and verbal ability and early school
achievement. In G. J. Duncan & J. Brooks-Gunn (Eds.), Consequences of
growing up poor, 132-189.

Snibbe, A. C., & Markus, H. R. (2005). You can't always get what you want: Educational
attainment, agency, and choice. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 88(4), 703-720.

Steele, C.M. (1988). The Psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the
self. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 261-302.

Stellar, J., Manzo, V., Kraus, M., & Keltner, D. (2012). Class and compassion:
Socioeconomic factors predict responses to suffering. Emotion, 12(3), 449-459.

Stephan, E., Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (2011). The effects of time perspective and level
of construal on social distance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(2),
397-402.

Stephens, N.M. & Townsend, S.M. (2013). Rank is not enough: Why we need a
sociocultural perspective to understand social class. Psychological Inquiry, 24(2),
126-130.

Stephens, N.M., Cameron, J.S., Townsend, S.M. (2014). Lower social class does not
(always) mean greater interdependence: Women in poverty have fewer social
resources than working-class women. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,
45(7), 1061-1073.

136

Stephens, N., Markus, H., & Townsend, S. (2007). Choice as an act of meaning: The case
of social class. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93(5), 814-830.

Suessenbach, F., & Moore, A. (2015). Individual differences in the explicit power motive
predict utilitarian choices in moral dilemmas, especially when this choice is selfbeneficial. Personality and Individual Differences, 86, 297-302.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour. In
S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Relations (pp. 7–
24). Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.

Tan, X., Liu, L., Zheng, W. and Huang, Z. (2015), Effects of social dominance
orientation and right-wing authoritarianism on corrupt intention: The role of
moral outrage. International Journal of Psychology.

Thye, S. R., Willer, D., & Markovsky, B. (2006). From status to power: New models at
the intersection of two theories. Social Forces, 84, 1471–1495.

Trautmann, S., van de Kuilen, G., & Zeckhauser, R. Social Class and (Un)Ethical
Behavior: Evidence from a large population sample. SSRN Electronic Journal.

Triandis, H. C. & Gelfland, M. J. (1998). Converging measurement of horizontal and
vertical individualism and collectivism. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 74, 118-128.

Tyler, T. R., Boeckmann, R. J., Smith, H. J., & Huo, Y. J. (1997). Social justice in a
diverse society. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Uehara, S., Nakagawa, T., & Tamura, T. (2014). What leads to evocation of moral
outrage? Exploring the role of personal morality. International Journal of
Psychological Studies, 6(1).

Vallacher, R. R., & Wegner, D. M. (1989). Levels of personal agency: Individual
variation in action identification. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
57, 660-671.

137

Van Berkel, L., Crandall, C., Eidelman, S., & Blanchar, J. (2015). Hierarchy, dominance,
and deliberation: Egalitarian values require mental effort. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 41(9), 1207-1222.
van den Bos, K. (2003). On the subjective quality of Social Justice: The role of affect as
information in the psychology of justice judgments. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 85(3), 482-498.

van der Toorn, J., & Jost, J. (2014). Twenty years of system justification theory:
Introduction to the special issue on "Ideology and system justification
processes". Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 17(4), 413-419.

Van de Vyver, J., & Abrams, D. (2015). Testing the prosocial effectiveness of the
prototypical moral emotions: Elevation increases benevolent behaviors and
outrage increases justice behaviors. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 58, 23-33.

van Dijk, E., & DeCremer, D. (2006). Self-benefiting in the allocation of scarce
resources: Leader-follower effects and the moderating effect of social value
orientations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 1352–1361.

van Eijk, G. (2012). Hostile to Hierarchy? Individuality, equality and moral boundaries in
Dutch class talk. Sociology, 47(3), 526-541.

Van Lange, P. M. (2008). Does empathy trigger only altruistic motivation? How about
selflessness or justice? Emotion, 8(6), 766-774.

van Leeuwen, F., & Park, J. (2009). Perceptions of social dangers, moral foundations,
and political orientation. Personality and Individual Differences, 47(3), 169-173.

Varnum, M. E. W., Blais, C., Hampton, R. S., & Brewer, G. A. (2015). Social class
affects neural empathic responses. Culture and Brain, 3(2), 122–130.

Watkins, E., Moberly, N. J., & Moulds, M. L. (2008). Processing mode causally
influences emotional reactivity: Distinct effects of abstract versus concrete
construal on emotional response. Emotion (Washington, D.C.), 8(3), 364–378.

138

Wenzel, M. (2004). A social categorisation approach to distributive justice. European
Review of Social Psychology, 15(1), 219-257.

Wiederkehr, V., Bonnot, V., Krauth-Gruber, S., & Darnon, C. (2015). Belief in school
meritocracy as a system-justifying tool for low status students. Frontiers in
Psychology, 6.
Wright, J., & Baril, G. (2011). The role of cognitive resources in determining our moral
intuitions: Are we all liberals at heart? Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 47(5), 1007-1012.

Zelditch, M. (1968). Social status. In D. Sills (Ed.), International encyclopedia of the
social sciences (pp. 250–257).

139

140

